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Abstract 
O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) in a review of the business ethics literature concluded that 
"ethical awareness" also called ethical sensitivity has received the least attention of the four steps 
in Rest's (1986) ethical decision making model. Available measures for ethical sensitivity are 
limited to specific contexts and suffer from several limitations. I extend the previous literature by 
creating a new measure for ethical sensitivity (AESS) that encompasses relevant dimensions for 
the accounting profession and is not specific to a particular setting. I also introduce a new 
individual differences variable to the accounting ethics literature. Specifically, I investigate the 
relationship between anti-intellectualism and ethical awareness. My findings support AESS as a 
measure of ethical sensitivity. 
KEY WORDS: Ethical Decision Making, Ethical Sensitivity, Anti-intellectualism. 
ABBREVIATIONS: AESS: Accountants' Ethical Sensitivity. 
NOTE: For my purposes the terms sensitivity and awareness are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper. 
iii 
Preface 
Ethical behavior is a must in the accounting 
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effort. 
iv 
Acknowledgment 
I want to thank Professors Darlene Bay and Gail Cook for their tremendous support. They 
believed in me and never gave up on me. lowe my success as an academic to them and I will be 
forever thankful for their support. 
I want to thank Professor Mark Julien for his valuable feedback. 
I also want to thank Ms. Marisa Battista, and Ms. Betty McDowell, for their incessant support 
and kindness. 
v 
Table of Content 
Section Page 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 7 
A. Ethical Decision Making Literature .... , ....................................................... 7 
B. Ethical Sensitivity Literature ..................................................... , ............ 15 
a. Definitions .............................................................................. 15 
b. Research on ethical sensitivity ....................................................... 16 
c. Operationalization of ethical sensitivity and critic ............................... 18 
d. Independent variables and findings ............................... : ................ 24 
C. Empirical Studies of Moral Intensity ......................................................... 31 
D. Multi-Dimensional Ethical Scale (MES) Literature ........................................ 33 
E. Anti-Intellectualism (AI) Literature .......................................................... 38 
F. Machiavellianism Literature ................................................................. .42 
G. Relativism and Idealism Literature ........................................................... .46 
III. SCALE DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................. 48 
A. Accountants' Ethical Sensitivity Scale (AESS) development ........................... .50 
a. Instrument Development. ............................................................. 50 
b. Pretest ................................................................................... 52 
B. Hypotheses related to content validity ...................................................... .53 
C. Supplemental analysis .......................................................................... 55 
IV. METHODOLOGy ...................................................................................... 56 
A. Subjects ........................................................................................... 56 
B. Sample ............................................................................................. 57 
C. Control for Social Desirability ................................................................ .57 
V. RESULTS .................................................................................................. 60 
A. Internal Validity ........................... , ..................................................... 60 
B. Construct validity .................... , .......................................................... 60 
C. Content Validity ............................................................... '" ............... 63 
D. Social Desirability Analysis ................................................................... 65 
E. Further Analysis ................................................................................. 66 
F. Post Hoc Analysis .............................................................................. 67 
VI. DISCUSSIONS .......................................................................................... 68 
VII. LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................... 71 
VIII. FOR FURTHER RESARCH .......................................................................... 72 
IX. REFERENCES ........................................................................................... 73 
vi 
Table of Content (Cont.) 
x. APEENDIX ............................................................................................... 85 
A. Appendix 1: AESS .............................................................................. 85 
vii 
List of Tables 
Table: Page 
1. List of Papers Relating to Ethical Sensitivity ......................................................... 18 
2. Update for Papers Relating to Ethical Sensitivity .................................................... 18 
3. Jones' Moral intensity characteristics .................................................................. 32 
4. Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies; ...................................................................... .47 
5. Studies and limitations .................................................................................... 49 
6. Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................... 57 
7. Reliability and factor analysis ............................................................................ 62 
8. Internal Reliabilities ....................................................................................... 64 
9. Regression Analysis ....................................................................................... 64 
10. Social Desirability Response Bias .............................. , ..................................... 66 
11. Individual Regressions .................................................................................. 66 
12. Paired t-test for unethical items with high and low moral intensity .............................. 67 
13. Paired t-test for ethical items with high and low moral intensity ................................. 67 
List of Figures 
viii 
Figure Page 
1. Rest'sModel. ............................................................................................ 12 
2. Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 53 
ix 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
Ethical decision making plays an important role in the accounting profession. Recent 
corporate scandals such as the Enron (2001) and WorldCom (2003) collapses brought the 
importance of ethical behavior in the business environment to a new level of awareness and 
increased the number of research studies in ethical decision making (O'Fallon and Butterfield's, 
2005; O'Leary and Pangemanan, 2007). Many studies in ethical decision making rely on Rest's 
(1986) model, which divides the ethical decision process into four independent components: 
ethical awareness, ethical judgment, ethical intention and ethical behavior. By independent, Rest 
(1986) meant that the success of one step will not necessarily lead to the success of the following 
step. Ethical awareness (for my purposes, ethical awareness and sensitivity will be used 
interchangeably) represents the first step of the ethical decision making process and is critical to 
the outcome. Hall (1992, p.37) states that "we need to sensitize people to moral issues and 
ambiguities. We should be more concerned, perhaps, about the person who passes by a moral 
dilemma without recognizing it than we are about the person who consciously and callously 
commits a wrong. In the long run, moral insensitivity could be our biggest problem". Individuals, 
before engaging in the ethical decision process, need to recognize the presence of an ethical 
issue. If they do not, they may engage in an unethical activity without knowing it. Thus any 
efforts to improve the level of ethical behavior in the accounting profession must be predicated 
on a high level of ethical sensitivity among accountants. 
The most recent literature review on ethical decision making (O'Fallon and Butterfield's, 
2005) exposed the scarcity of research in ethical sensitivity. More specifically, their analysis 
concluded that there were only 28 ethical sensitivity findings compared to 185 for ethical 
judgment, 86 for ethical intent and 85 for ethical behavior. Their review of the literature included 
articles published in a specified set of journals from 1996 to 2003. Only 18 of these articles out 
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of 174 (10.34 %) were about ethical sensitivity with only six of those from the accounting 
discipline. Interestingly, only one paper included a Canadian sample (Cohen et aI., 2001). I 
updated their sample and created a new list that included research in ethical sensitivity up to 
2010. In the update to the review of the literature, there were only 26 journal articles on ethical 
sensitivity, from which three were in the accounting discipline. To summarize, I found only nine 
articles about accountant's ethical sensitivity and only two of them used a Canadian sample 
(Cohen et al., 1996 and Cohen et al., 2001). Interestingly, none of those studies included CMAs 
or CGAs in their sample. Based on my findings, research on Canadian accountants' ethical 
sensitivity is very limited and needs to be expanded to better understand the ethical conduct of 
Canadian accountants. Previous research showed significant differences between Canadian and 
U.S accountants' moral reasoning (e.g., Etherington and Schulting, 1995). I also recognize that 
some research failed to support the moral reasoning difference between Canadian and U.S 
accountants (e.g., Thome et al., 2003). The disagreement in findings in the moral reasoning 
literature supports the need to better understand the ethical characteristic of the accounting 
popUlation in both countries. Further, it should not be taken on faith that findings in the U.S. 
context will necessarily be generalizable to other cultures and other countries. 
Research in ethical sensitivity is a very challenging task due to the situational nature of 
ethical behavior. Individuals may behave differently in different settings. Thus, the literature 
includes various methodologies to measure ethical sensitivity such as: vignettes or scenarios 
(Karcher, 1996; Cohen et aI., 1996; Yetmar and Eastman, 2000; Cohen et aI., 2001; Fleischman 
and Valentine, 2003; Valentine and Fleischman, 2003; Chan and Leung, 2006; Shawver and 
Senetti, 2009; Sparks and Hunt, 1998; Mugan et al., 2005), questionnaires (Ameen et al. 1996: 
Lau, 2010), and interviews (Lepper, 2005). However, ,previous operationalizations of ethical 
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sensitivity suffer from several limitations: the absence of a control for social desirability bias, the 
lack of attention to moral intensity elements, the homogeneous structure of the instruments, the 
scarcity of dimensions and vignettes and a lack of generalizability. Most of the previous findings 
on ethical sensitivity are strictly context specific and are not generalizable to other settings. 
Unfortunately, this approach may not give us a good understanding of accountants' ethical 
sensitivity capable of helping the profession move forward in addressing the ethics problem. 
Ethical sensitivity, the first step of Rest's (1986) model, requires the recognition of an 
ethical issue. The literature on ethical sensitivity includes several definitions for example, 
Butterfield et al.'s (2000, p.982) definition "a person's recognition that his/her potential decision 
or action could affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of the self or others in a fashion that 
may conflict with one or more ethical standards", or Shaub's (1993) definition "ability to 
recognize the ethical nature of a decision" (p.147). Shaub's (1993) definition is in agreement 
with all of the available definition for ethical sensitivity. Therefore, for my purposes, I use 
Shaub's (1993) definition to conceptualize ethical sensitivity. 
The purpose of this study is to create a new measure of accountant's ethical sensitivity 
called: Accountant's Ethical Sensitivity Scale (AESS).The AESS measure targets better 
generalizability, fewer limitations and a finer proxy for accountant's ethical sensitivity. 
To accomplish this goal, I reviewed the literature on ethical sensitivity including non-accounting 
studies and identified the noted limitations. Based on these limitations, I identified a set of 
criteria that should be considered when constructing a measure for accountant's ethical 
sensitivity. These include: controlling for social desirability; including moral intensity; and using 
a balanced setting with a variety of dimensions and multiple vignettes. 
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Previous literature on ethics indicates the necessity of controlling for social desirability 
bias (Fernandes and Randall, 1992). Furthermore, accountants have certain characteristics, such 
as Machiavellianism, that reinforce the necessity of controlling for social desirability specifically 
for this population. More precisely, accountants are characterized by a low level of 
Machiavellianism compared to other professionals from other disciplines (Wakefield, 2008). 
Additionally, Machiavellianism is negatively correlated with social desirability (Jones and 
Kavanagh, 1996). Therefore, accountants are more likely to suffer from social desirability bias 
than individuals from other disciplines. Interestingly, out of the nine identified articles on 
accountant's ethical sensitivity only five controlled for social desirability bias. However, most of 
these studies employed the "Halo Effect" measure for social desirability instead of using a 
separate instrument. The "Halo Effect" is measured by calculating the difference between what 
the individual reports he would do and what he believes his peers would do. However, there is 
evidence indicating that this methodology (the "Halo Effect measure") is not a reliable measure 
of social desirability bias. These findings raise questions about previous results regarding 
accountant's ethical sensitivity. Therefore, I included a control for social desirability bias. 
Jones (1991) argues that moral intensity has an impact on individuals' ability to 
recognize an ethical issue: "moral issues of high intensity will be more salient than those of low 
intensity" (p. 380). Therefore, moral intensity needs to be considered when establishing an 
ethical sensitivity measure. Interestingly, out of the nine accountants; ethical sensitivity studies, 
only two included moral intensity in their instrument. However, none of the studies included the 
moral intensity dimensions identified by Jones (1991). The literature shows that some moral 
intensity components are more predictive than others. The studies that controlled for moral 
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intensity did not pick a certain intensity component; rather, they varied the level of severity of 
their scenarios. 
Jones (1991) proposed 6 moral intensity dimensions: magnitude of consequences, social 
consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration of effect. 
Including all of these dimensions will lengthen any instrument (each item would have 12 
versions). Moreover, research on moral intensity (Frey, 2000; McMahon and Harvey, 2006) 
shows that a subset of these components may be enough to represent moral intensity. A 
consensus has been reached in the literature that magnitude of consequences and social 
consensus are important components of moral intensity (Waldron, 2009; O'Fallen and 
Butterfield, 2005; McMahon and Harvey 2006). Therefore, I include both: magnitude of 
consequences and the social consensus in my instrument to reinforce its reliability. 
In order to measure ethical sensitivity, respondents need to distinguish between ethical 
and unethical issues. Interestingly, most of the research on ethical sensitivity (lout of 9) did not 
include an ethical statement in their instrument. The prevalence of unethical issues in the 
scenarios jeopardizes the balance of the instrument. Individuals were asked to identify to what 
extent they perceived the issue as unethical knowing that it was unethical. In this case 
respondents did not have to identify the issue as ethical or unethical. This approach does not fit 
the theoretical framework of the ethical sensitivity literature. For this reason, I created a balanced 
setting, in which I included ethical and unethical issues. The presence of ethical issues in the 
scenarios strengthens the balance of the AESS. 
Previous instruments used to measure ethical sensitivity suffer from a limited number of 
dimensions. Unless the vignettes load on different dimensions, their usage limits the findings on 
accountants' ethical sensitivity to the context presented to the respondents. Only one instrument 
5 
in the ethical sensitivity literature has different dimensions and thus the potential ability to 
generalize its finding to a larger sample. The Multidimensional Ethical Scale (MES) explains 
why accountants perceive an issue as ethical or not and explains a proportion of their intention to 
commit an ethical act. However, it is important to mention that the MES does not fully explain 
the full complexity of the ethical decision dynamic but only explains a proportion of it. 
Moreover, the MES literature contains many inconsistencies, which jeopardize claims about its 
reliability. Jones and Ponemon (1993 pAll), criticizing the Flory et al. (1992) study, argue that 
"the multidimensional scale fails to provide a useful psychometric construct for measuring the 
ethical thinking process for professional accountants". A consistent set of dimensions will 
mitigate this problem. Items in my instrument are associated with seven dimensions. These 
dimensions will contribute to a higher generalizability than previous attempts in the ethical 
sensitivity literature. 
To summarize, the AESS mitigates several problems encountered with other instruments 
by controlling for social desirability, including a moral intensity treatment, creating a balance 
between ethical and unethical items, using a variety of dimensions and using multiple vignettes. 
The AESS targets Canadian accountants and for this reason, before finalizing the instrument, six 
accountants from three different accounting organizations, CAs, CMAs and CGAs, provided 
valuable feedback on relevance and wording. Changes were made based on their comments. 
Furthermore, I pre-tested the instruments' internal validity by administering it to fourth year 
accounting co-op students. These students have had accounting work experience. Again, minor 
changes were made to the instrument based on the feedback from this group. 
Results from the analysis showed that the AESS has a good internal, content and 
construct validity. The data support the hypothesized relationships between Relativism, 
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Machiavellianism and Anti-Intellectualism, and ethical sensitivity. These relationships show that 
the instrument is actually measuring ethical sensitivity and that overall, results from this study 
provide support for the use of the AESS as a measure of accountants' ethical sensitivity. 
The remainder of my paper is organized as the following. In the second section, I provide 
a literature review for ethical decision making and ethical sensitivity. I also review empirical 
studies of moral intensity and Multi- Dimensional Ethical Scale (MES). Then, I review research· 
results relating to the criterion variables used to establish content validity: Anti-Intellectualism 
(AI), Machiavellianism, Relativism and Idealism. In the third section, I present my model and 
develop my hypotheses. The fourth section explains the methodology used to develop and test 
the AESS. Section 5 reports the results from my tests. In section 6, I discuss my findings. Section 
7 and 8 provide the limitation and future research respectively. 
II. LITERA TURE REVIEW: 
A. Ethical Decision Making Literature: 
Ethical decision making plays an important role in the accounting profession. Recent 
corporate scandals such as the Enron (2001) and WorldCom (2003) collapses brought the 
importance of ethical behavior in the business environment to a new level of awareness and 
increased the number of research studies in ethical decision making (O'Leary and Pangemanan, 
2007; O'Fallon and Butterfield's, 2005). The literature provides us with various definitions for 
ethical decision making. For example: Jones (1991 p. 367) defines an ethical decision as a 
"decision that is both legal and morally acceptable to the larger community' , , whereas an 
"unethical decision is either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community". The 
Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW) Code of Ethics (AASW, 1999,Section 5.1) 
defines ethical decision making as a "process of critical reflection, evaluation and judgment 
through which a practitioner resolves ethical issues, problems and dilemmas" (p. 22). Cohen et 
7 
al. (2001, p. 321) define ethical decision making as "decision making in situations where ethical 
conflicts are present". 
The development of models of ethical decision making, like the development of agreed 
upon definitions, has been important to the development of research in business ethics. Ferrell 
and Gresham (1985), Trevino (1986), Rest (1986), Bommer et al. (1987) and Jones (1991) have 
all provided theoretical models that represent the foundation of research in ethical decision 
making. These conceptual models did not include empirical tests. Based on these models, 
empirical work took various forms to investigate the impact of various variables on ethical 
decision making. Below, I review several ethical decision making models. Only Rest's (1986) 
model contains specific reference to ethical sensitivity. However, the other models are important 
to understanding of the breadth of the research that has been conducted to date into ethical 
decision making. 
Some research took place before the appearance of these theoretical frameworks (Carrol, 
1975; Bowman, 1976; Brenner and Molander, 1977; Hegarly and Sims, 1978; Ward and Wilson, 
1980; Dubinsky and Ingram, 1984). Most of this research looked at the impact of elements of the 
organizational environment such as pressure, reinforcement mechanisms (reward, punishment 
and availability of a code of conduct) and competitiveness (Carrol, 1975; Bowman, 1976, 
Brenner and Molander, 1977). Findings from these studies were mixed and very little attention 
was given to other factors such as cultural variables, personality characteristics and the intensity 
of the ethical issues. The lack of theoretical frameworks and guidance may explain why research 
in ethical decision making in the mid-seventies and early eighties could not precisely identify 
variables that may have an impact on ethical decision making (Bommer, 1987). 
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Ferrell and Gresham (1985), using a contingency framework, proposed determinants for 
ethical and unethical decision making. They identified 4 constructs: individual factors, 
significant others, organizational factors, and opportunity. The individual factors (knowledge, 
values, attitudes and intentions) were based on philosophical perspectives: utilitarianism, 
teleological and deontological philosophy, rights principles and justice principles. The influence 
of significant others was posited based on two theories: differential association theory 
(Sutherland and Cressey, 1970) and role-set theory (Merton, 1957). Under the differential 
association theory individuals learn from others' behavior (Sutherland and Cressey, 1970). This 
plays an important role in the ethical decision process since it permits the identification of 
referents (individual that have an influence over others' behavior) (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). 
The role-set theory complements the differential association theory by explaining the interaction 
between the focal and the referent individual. This theory focuses on the distance between these 
two types of individuals. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) expected that the greater the distance 
between the referent and the focal decision maker the less impact the referent can have on 
ethical/unethical decision making. This theory supports the investigation of whether individuals' 
ethical/unethical decision making in an organization is influenced by peer groups or upper 
management (referent other). Ferrell and Gresham (1985) also proposed that opportunity can be 
one of the determinants of ethical/unethical decision making. By opportunity we mean 
punishment and reward (internal and external). The organizational factors include daily tasks 
such as meeting the business goals. Individuals within a firm seek recognition and good 
performance evaluation. Ethical conduct within an organization may not always play in favor of 
reaching these goals. Reaching these goals and obtaining a good performance evaluation creates 
pressure that may push an individual to engage in an unethical behavior. Ferrell and Gresham 
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(1985) propOsed various propositions of how individuals may be influenced throughout their 
decision-making process. 
Trevino (1986), based on Kohlberg's (1969) work, proposed a theoretical model that 
considers the interaction of individual and situational factors in the ethical decision making 
process. Kohlberg (1969) argued that individuals determine what is right and what is wrong 
based on their level of cognitive moral development (CMD). However, the cognitive 
development by itself is not enough to explain or predict ethical/unethical behavior since 
someone's behavior could also be affected by individual and situational factors. Individual 
factors are "attributes that are unique to the decision-maker and covers two main features 
namely, demographic and psychological" (O'Leary and Pangemanan, 2007, p. 217). Trevino 
(1986) presented three individual factors: ego strength, field dependence and locus of control 
and, three situational factors: immediate job context (reinforcement and other pressure), 
organizational culture (normative structure, referent others, obedience to authority and 
responsibility for consequences) and characteristics of the work (role taking and resolution of 
moral conflict). The model proposed by Trevino (1986) proposes that the interaction between 
these individual factors and the situational factors will have an impact on the connection between 
cognition and ethical actions. 
Bommer et al.'s (1987) conceptual model reduces the complexity of the determinants of 
ethical/unethical decision making and represents the fIrst trial in the literature to map 
determinants of ethical and unethical decision making. The model includes six components: 
work environment, professional environment, personal environment, governmentllegal 
environment, social environment, and individual attributes (moral level, personal goals, 
motivation mechanism, position/status, self-concept, life experiences, personality and 
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demographics). They argue that information acquisition, information processing, cognitive 
process, perceived rewards and perceived losses all mediate the relationship between 
ethical/unethical behavior and these six components. They also point out that these factors do not 
uniquely determine ethical decision making, rather the combination between these factors 
merely influences the decision maker's preference for ethical behavior over unethical or vice 
versa. 
In the same paper, Bommer et al. (1987) presented another model for the decision making 
process which breaks it down into multiple steps. The manager first perceives a problem 
associated with environmental factors (this step is quite close to ethical sensitivity). Then, he 
filters (selective perception process) the associated information. Finally, based on his individual 
attributes and cognitive process, he constructs the conceptual model of the decision space. 
Hogarth (1980) showed that people's capacity to receive information is limited. Bommer et al. 
(1987), building on Hogarth's (1980) work, concluded that decisions made by individuals could 
also reflect their limitation in information processing. 
Rest's (1986) model has been most widely used in the accounting ethics literature. His 
model breaks down the ethical decision making process into four separate steps: (1) recognizing 
the moral issue, (2) making a moral judgment, (3) establishing moral intent, and (4) acting on 
the moral concerns. In the first step, the individual recognizes the existence of an ethical issue. 
Some individuals may not be able to recognize the presence of an ethical dilemma and therefore 
will not engage in an ethical decision making process. In the second step, the individual analyzes 
the ethical issue using his cognitive abilities. Individuals have different levels of cognitive moral 
development and therefore different ways to make a moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1976). Once an 
individual has made his moral judgment, he determines his intentions (Step 3). In this phase 
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individuals analyze the interaction of different factors at stake. For example, once an individual 
judged that a proposed action was unethical he may have the intention to behave unethically and 
may not. His intention will depend on other factors such as pressure or the opinions of significant 
others. Once an individual has determined his intentions, the last step is to implement his 
intentions (act as planned). Rest (1986) argues that these steps are independent and the success of 
one does not depend on the success of the other. For example, an individual's intentions do not 
depend solely on his moral judgment. 
Figure 1: Rest's Model 
Ethical Ethical 
--'" 
Intentions Behavior 
~ 
Perception Judgments 
Jones (1991), from Rest's (1986) ethical decision making model, developed a new 
theoretical model to better understand the ethical decision making process. His model represents 
the first attempt in the literature to incorporate moral intensity issues into the ethical decision 
process. Jones' (1991) model focuses on the interaction between moral intensity and 
Rests'(1986) four steps in ethical decision making (recognize moral issue, make moral judgment, 
establish moral intent and engage in moral behavior). A moral issue is present in a situation 
where "the action or decision must have consequences for others and must involve choice, or 
volition" (Jones, 1991 p. 367). Jones (1991) argued that individuals respond to the intensity of 
the moral issue and not just to the issue itself. Jones (1991, p.381) argues that "High-intensity 
moral issues are salient and vivid, they will be more likely to catch the attention of the moral 
decision maker ... " He proposed six characteristics: Magnitude of Consequences (Me): "the sum 
of the harms (or benefits) done to victims (or beneficiaries) of the moral act in question" (p. 374), 
Social Consensus (SC):" the degree of social agreement that a proposed act is evil (or good)" (p. 
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375), Probability of Effect (PE):" a joint function of the probability that the act in question will 
actually take place and the act in question will actually cause the harm (benefit) predicted" (p. 
375), Temporal bnmediacy (TI): "the length of time between the present and the onset of 
consequences of the moral act in question (Shorter length of time implies greater immediacy)" 
(p. 376), Proximity (PX): "the feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or physical) 
that the moral agent has for victims (Beneficiaries) of the evil (beneficial) act in question" (376), 
and Concentration of Effect (CE): "an inverse function of the number of people affected by an 
act of given magnitude" (p.377). 
Each component of moral intensity is expected to incrementally impact the intensity of 
the moral issue. Every moral issue encompasses all of these characteristics that interact which 
each other. For this reason we should only consider the incremental effect of each of these 
characteristics. These characteristics do not include the decision maker's personal traits or the 
effect of the environment around him. Moral intensity characteristics are strictly related to the 
particular moral issue. Jones (1991) argued that these characteristics will have an impact on 
individuals when recognizing the moral issue, making moral judgments, establishing moral 
intent and engaging in moral behavior. Organizational factors, on the other hand, will only 
intervene when establishing moral intent and engaging in moral behavior. Thus, Jones' moral 
intensity variables can be expected to impact ethical sensitivity, while his organization variables 
would not. 
The models by Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Trevino (1986), Rest (1986), Bommer et al. 
(1987) and Jones (1991) were not empirically tested when they were proposed; A significant 
number of research studies in ethical decision making applied some aspects of their theoretical 
propositions and have provided empirical tests for those relationships. 
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Ford and Richardson (1994) provided a review of the empirical work done on the 
determinants of ethical decision making. They broke down these determinants into two different 
categories: individual and situational factors. Individual factors consist of personal attributes 
(age, sex, religion and nationality), education/employment background (type of education, years 
of education, employment and years of employment) and personality traits (Machiavellianism, 
locus of control and other variables). Situational factors consist of referent groups (peer group 
influence, top management influence and sanction and rewards), code of conduct, type of ethical 
decision, organizational factors (organization effects (organizational climate), organization size, 
and organization level) and industry factors (industry type and business competiveness). Ford 
and Richardson (1994) concluded that empirical research in business ethics has not yet been able 
to establish a strong basis due to the limited research in some areas and mixed conclusions in 
others. Research results on personal attributes and education/employment background are mixed: 
some studies find that personal attributes and education/employment background have an impact 
on ethical decision making and other studies find that personal attributes and 
education/employment background do not have an impact on ethical decision making. Results 
from research on personality traits are likewise not clearly established. However, 
Machiavellianism has been verified as a personality variable strongly related to ethical decision 
making. 
A more recent review of the literature (see list of journals below) was completed by 0' 
Fallon and Butterfield (2005). Their review of the literature included research in ethical decision 
making published in top business journals from 1996 to 2003. They grouped the ethical decision 
making studies into four categories following Rest's (1986) model. Based on their findings, 
ethical sensitivity has received the least attention in the literature followed by ethical intention. 
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0' Fallon and Butterfield (2005) constructed a table including the number of findings reported 
for different independent variables. Interestingly, a significant number of independent variables 
were only tested with the last three steps of Rest's model: ethical sensitivity was excluded. For 
example, locus of control and Machiavellianism were used in studies for judgment and intent but 
not for ethical sensitivity. 
B. Ethical Sensitivity Literature: 
a. Definitions: 
Ethical sensitivity, the first step of Rest's (1986) model, requires the recognition of an 
ethical issue. Individuals may engage in unethical behavior if they fail to recognize the presence 
of an ethical issue. For example, Gioia, a Ford Motor Company Recall Coordinator, was not able 
to recognize ethical issues when making the decision not to recall the Ford Pinto because his 
cognitive motivation relied upon scripts that did not include ethical dimensions (Gioia, 1992). He 
stated that he "unconsciously overlook[ed] key features of the Pinto case ... Although the 
outcomes of the case carry retrospectively obvious ethical overtones, the schemas driving my 
perceptions and actions precluded consideration of the issues in ethical terms because the scripts 
did not include ethical dimensions" (Gioia 1992, p.385). Moreover, Hall (1992, p.37) stated that 
"we need to sensitize people to moral issues and ambiguities. We should be more concerned, 
perhaps, about the person who passes by a moral dilemma without recognizing it than we are 
about the person who consciously and callously commits a wrong. In the long run, moral 
insensitivity could be our biggest problem". 
The literature on ethical sensitivity has employed several definitions for ethical 
sensitivity. For example, Butterfield et al. (2000, p.982) define it as "a person's recognition that 
hislher potential decision or action could affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of the self 
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or others in a fashion that may conflict with one or more ethical standards". Shaub (1993, p.147) 
defines ethical sensitivity as the "ability to recognize the ethical nature of a decision". Shaub 
states that (1993, p.157) for him, the "recognition of the ethical issues in the scenario, 
regardless of the importance attached to these issues, served as the absolute measure of ethical 
sensitivity". Bebeau et al.'s (1985, p.226) definition "involves an awareness that something one 
might do or is doing can affect the welfare of someone else (or may affect others' welfare 
indirectly by violating a general practice of commonly held social standard)", or Sparks and 
Hunt's (1998) conceptualization of Volker's (1984) theory, where they conceptualize ethical 
sensitivity as the "the ability to recognize that a decision-making situation has ethical 
content and the ascription of importance to the ethical issues composing that content" 
(p.95). All of these definitions have much in common with definition of the first step of Rest's 
(1986) model which consists of the decision maker's ability to recognize an ethical issue. For 
that reason, and because Rest's model is important to this research as well as many accounting 
ethics studies, that is the definition that is employed in this paper. Ethical sensitivity and ethical 
awareness are two interchangeable terminologies in the literature and for this reason they both 
appear in this paper. 
b. Research on ethical sensitivity: 
O'Fallon and Butterfield's (2005) review of the literature shows that, even though ethical 
sensitivity is an important step in Rest's (1986) model; it is the least explored dimension. Their 
work represents a continuation of previous literature reviews by Loe et al. (2000) and Ford and 
Richardson (1994). O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) searched for the term "ethical decision-
making" in ABIlInform and PsycINFO. They included articles published between 1996-2003 in 
the following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
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Business Ethics Quarterly, Human Relations, Journal of Academy of Marketing Science, Journal 
of Business Ethics, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Personal 
Selling & Sales Management, Accounting, Auditing, & Accountability Journal, Business & 
Society, European Journal of Marketing, International Journal of Management, Journal of 
American Academy of Business, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Journal of Management 
Studies, Journal of Managerial Issues, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, Managerial Auditing Journal and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
process. O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) classified the 174 identified journal articles according 
to where they fit into Rest's (1986) model. Their analysis indicates 28 findings for ethical 
sensitivity, 185 for ethical judgment, 86 for ethical intent and 85 for ethical behavior. 
From their analysis, I extracted the articles related to ethical awareness (Table 1) and found 18 
articles related to ethical awareness (10.34 % of the total number of articles). Interestingly, only 
6 of these studies were in accounting and only one of them used a Canadian sample. 
Following the same methodology, I updated the sample. To better match my objectives, I 
only included articles from ABIlInform and searched for "ethical sensitivity" or "ethical 
awareness". After revising the search engine results (I only considered articles that were focused 
on ethical sensitivity), as illustrated below, I found 7 new articles in ethical sensitivity (Table 2). 
These papers form the basis of the literature review that follows. 
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Table 1: List of Papers Relating to Ethical Sensitivity 
Authors Journal Year Accounting SAMPLE 
Ameen et al. JBE 1996 Yes U.S 
Karcher JBE 1996 Yes U.S 
Sparks and Hunt JOM 1998 No N/A 
Singhapakdi et al. JAMS 1999 No N/A 
Weaver and Trevino BEQ 1999 No N/A 
Butterfield et al. HR 2000 No N/A 
Singhapakdi et al. JBE 2000 No N/A 
Yetmar and Eastman JBE 2000 Yes U.S 
Cohen et al. JBE 2001 Yes Canada 
Singhapakdi et al. JBE 2001 No N/A 
Barnett and Valentine JBR 2002 No N/A 
May and Pauli B&S 2002 No N/A 
Cherry et al.:JBE JBE 2003 No N/A 
Fleischman and Valentine JBE 2003 Yes U.S 
Valentine and Fleischman JBE 2003 Yes U.S 
VanSandt B&S 2003 No N/A 
Singhapakdi et al. JBE 1996a No N/A 
Singhapakdi et al. JBR 1996b No N/A 
Total number of article = 18 
*JBE: Journal of Business Ethics, * JBR: Journal of Business Research, *HR: Human Relations, *B&S: Business 
and Society, *JAMS: Journal of Academy of Marketing Science, *JOM: Journal of Marketing, *BEQ: Business 
Ethics Quarterly. 
Table 2: Update for Papers Relating to Ethical Sensitivity 
Author Journal Year Accounting Sample 
Conroy and Emerson JBE 2004 No U.S 
Lepper JBE 2005 No U.S 
Mugan JBE 2005 No U.Sffurkey 
Chan and Leung MAJ 2006 Yes Hong Kong 
Oumlil and Balloun JBE 2008 No U.S/ Marroco 
Shawver and Senetti JBE 2009 Yes U.S 
Lau JBE 2009 No Not specified 
* Managerial Auditing Journal 
c. Operationalization of ethical sensitivity and critique: 
Ethical sensitivity has been measured in various ways. Shaub's (1993) ethical sensitivity 
instrument consists of one auditing scenario that contains three moral issues. After reading the 
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scenario, he asked participants to indicate the number of issues they encountered in the case and 
the importance of the issue. The moral issues were: "1. the failure of staff to charge time required 
to complete the job ('eating hours"); 2. The use of client or firm time to write a note to a 
prospective employer; and 3. The subordination of an auditor's judgment over an issue involving 
generally accepted accounting principles" (Shaub, 1993 p. 161). 
Shaub's measurement of ethical sensitivity raises some concerns. His instrument asked 
respondents to list the issue(s) about which they were concerned. Some respondents may have 
seen an issue but were not worried about it, and therefore did not list it. Ethical sensitivity by 
definition is the recognition of an ethical issue and not the concern about it. Shaub (1993) used 
only one scenario to capture respondents' ethical sensitivity. Finch (1987, p.112) stated " ... on 
the basis of a single vignette one can probably make clear statements only about the particular 
circumstances specified". Moreover, Randall and Gibson (1990) argued in favor of using 
multiple vignettes instead of one or only a few. Increasing the number of vignettes is a very 
tempting approach to deal with the situational aspect of the ethical decision making process. 
Citing the work of Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg (1984), Trevino (1986, p.61O) explained that 
"moral action takes place in social context and can be influenced heavily by situational variables. 
Therefore, ethical/unethical behavior in practical situations is not simply a product of fixed 
individual characteristics, but results from an interaction between the individual and the 
situation". However, the question becomes how many vignettes should one use (Finch, 1987). It 
will be very difficult to include all the possible combinations of ethical dilemmas. Furthermore, 
using multiple vignettes may be misleading. Vignettes represent hypothetical situations where 
the respondents need to picture themselves and their behavior. Respondents may behave 
differently in a real life situation than in a hypothetical situation (Rooks et al., 2000). 
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Ameen et al. (1996) measured ethical sensitivity by administering a 23 item questionnaire 
containing unethical issues with which students were familiar. The questionnaire asks students to 
provide their opinions about the severity of the stated unethical activity based on a 5-point likert 
scale. All the items included unethical behavior related to academic misconduct. This setting 
lacks ambiguity and makes it easier for respondents to know the purpose of the study. 
Furthermore, respondents were not tested for their ability to recognize an unethical issue. The 
issue was there and they were asked to provide an opinion and judge its severity. As shown, the 
format of the instrument deviates from the definition of ethical sensitivity and does not test 
students' ability to recognize an ethical issue. 
Karcher (1996) used three scenarios from the Trueblood Case Series (Deloitte and 
Touche, 1989). The chosen ethical issues were tax evasion, independence and plant relocation. 
The scenarios with different levels of severity were administered to CP As working for the Big 
Six firms. Participants were asked to write down the issues they encountered in the cases. Two 
independent judges had a list of the issues and coded the respondents' answers as dichotomous 
variables (issue mentioned or not). This study is limited by the use of only three vignettes. The 
low number of vignettes reduces the generalizability of the findings because some accountants 
may be able to recognize an ethical issue in those specific scenarios but not in others and vice 
versa. 
Sparks and Hunt (1998) conceptualized two definitions of ethical sensitivity: (1) based on 
Shaub's (1989) theory: "Ethical sensitivity is the ability to recognize that a decision-making 
situation has ethical content" (p. 95) and (2) based on Volker's (1984) theory: "Ethical 
sensitivity is the ability to recognize that a decision-making situation has ethical content 
and the ascription of importance to the ethical issues composing that content" (p.95). The first 
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definition considers ethical sensitivity as a dichotomous variable (recognize an issue or not) and 
the second definition considers it as a continuous variable (to what degree individuals recognize 
the issue). They created a research design to test for differences between these two definitions. 
They argued that teachers and students have different levels of ethical sensitivity. Their model 
included seven predictor variables (the independent variables) and two dependent variables (two 
approaches to measure ethical sensitivity). The first measure of ethical sensitivity consisted of 
the unweighted ethical sensitivity scores (identifies the number of ethical issues detected by the 
respondents, similar to the technique used by Butterfield as cited above). The second measure 
consisted of the weighted ethical sensitivity based on responses on a 7 -point Likert scale. They 
use a marketing research case to measure ethical sensitivity. Their instrument suffers from the 
same limitation presented in Karcher's (1996) study. The generalizability of their findings is 
limited to this unique scenario that contained a limited set of ethical issues. 
Sparks and Hunt (1998) also explored the difference between the two definitions of 
ethical sensitivity and tried to empirically identify the superior view. The authors defined two 
measures for ethical sensitivity; the first model uses mean weighted measures for the dependent 
variable and the second model uses an unweighted measure (ranges from 0 to 3: it only shows 
the number of identified issues and does not show to what extent they were recognized). Then, 
using LISREL 7, they compared the model fit between both models. They argued that a 
significant difference between those models will demonstrate that one approach is superior to the 
other one. Results using the equality constrained approach (paths between each dependent 
variable to the independent variable were equal) showed a significant difference between the two 
models. Due to the high correlation (.95) between the dependent variables the authors examined 
both models without the equality constraint and reported that the models were not significantly 
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different. These results are contradictory to the theoretical framework. Based on both definitions 
of ethical sensitivity, an individual needs to recognize an issue and then assess its importance. 
More precisely, the recognition of an ethical issue happens before the determination of its extent. 
Once an individual is assessing the magnitude of the ethical dilemma, we can infer that he 
recognized the existence of this ethical issue. This explains the high correlation between both 
dependent variables in this paper since recognizing an ethical issue is embedded in assessing its 
extent. We would not expect a significant difference in model fits. 
Butterfield et al. (2000) measured ethical sensitivity qualitatively; they asked the 
respondents to list relevant issues in two scenarios. Then, they classified these issues in two 
categories based on whether included moral issues were mentioned or not. Once they coded all 
the issues listed by respondents, they added up the scores and came up with a moral awareness 
score. As discussed previously, the lack of diversification of ethical dilemmas represents a 
significant limitation to their findings. 
Yetmar and Eastman (2000) used four tax scenarios containing eight ethical issues (one 
ethical issue in the first and second scenario, four ethical issues in the third scenario and two 
issues in the fourth scenario) and administered them to experienced professional accountants. 
Participants had to identify any issues they encountered and determine their degree of 
significance on a 7-point likert scale. Each issue score ranged from zero to seven (zero if the 
respondent was unable to recognize the issue and one to seven, depending on the degree of 
significance accorded). The instrument included a different number of issues in each scenario. 
However, all scenarios included at least one issue. The inclusion of neutral scenarios is 
necessary to preserve the instrument's balance and to prevent an artificial increase in 
respondent's sensitivity. Karcher (1996), for example, provided respondents with neutral, severe 
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and less severe ethical scenarios to mitigate increased sensitivity. Adding neutral statements 
reminds the respondents that the statements are not necessarily unethical and therefore they need 
to implement their judgment as if they were in a real life dilemma. 
Mugan et al. (2005)' s ethical sensitivity instrument included sixteen vignettes, each 
containing an ethical dilemma. After administering the survey, they ask the respondents to judge 
the ethicality of the actions portrayed in the vignettes using a 7-point likert scale (from definitely 
ethical to definitely unethical). They speculate that this measure measures ethical sensitivity. 
More precisely, they defined ethical sensitivity as "the tendency to judge the conduct unethical, 
thus higher scores are associated with greater ethical sensitivity" (p.147). This definitions 
deviates from previous literature on ethical sensitivity and refers more to the moral reasoning 
component in the ethical decision process (Rest (1986)'s second step) where respondents have to 
rely on their cognitive abilities to judge what is right or wrong. 
Lepper (2005) used a funnel interview technique (they start by asking the respondents 
questions in a general manner and get more specific toward the end) to measure ethical 
sensitivity. In her study, she provided her interviewees with two taped ethical scenarios followed 
by interview questions and a questionnaire. The interviews lasted for about 45 minutes. The 
questions fit the definition of ethical sensitivity; however, the instruments suffer from significant 
limitations. First, only two scenarios were used; respondents who are familiar with those two 
specific situations will have different results from individuals who never faced such dilemmas. 
Second, face-to-face interviews may not be a reliable measure of ethical sensitivity because of 
the lack of anonymity and the increased risk of social desirability bias. Finally, both scenarios 
were taped; some respondents may not recall all the elements from the tape. More·specifically, 
some respondents may be better at recognizing ethical issues when they are presented paper-
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based rather than in an audio tape. Her instrument format may suffer from a primacy/recency 
effect. Under the primary/recency theory, individuals are more likely to retrieve information 
about things said in the beginning and at the end than things said in the middle. Further, the 
interview format is very time consuming and limits the sample size that can be obtained. 
Lau (2010) used the Attitude Toward Business Ethics Questionnaire (ATBEQ) to 
measure ethical sensitivity. Each of the 30 items on the ATBEQ represents a statement about an 
ethical issue. Once administered to the target sample, the researcher asks the respondent whether 
they agree or disagree with the statements. The ATBEQ was widely used to capture ethical 
values in a certain culture (e.g., Moore & Radloff, 1996; Sims, 2006). The authors speculate that 
ethical sensitivity (awareness) and ethical attitude toward business ethics is the same. The 
ATBEQ measures ethical values and does not capture someone's ability to recognize ethical 
issues. Most of the statements do not depict an ethical dilemma. Respondents only provide their 
opinions about broad moral value statements which do not picture an ethical dilemma where they 
have to make a judgment. For example, in item 24 on the ATBEQ: "the business world has its 
own rules", respondents only agree or disagree with the statement, but this does not provide us 
with their ability to perceive or judge an ethical dilemma. 
d. Independent variables and findings: 
Some research in ethical sensitivity has been conducted to identify factors that influence 
individuals' capability to recognize an ethical issue. Butterfield et al. (2000) investigated the 
impact of some of the moral intensity components defined by Jones (1991), as well as framing 
and competitiveness on moral awareness. Specifically, they examined the impact of magnitude 
of consequences (MC), framing (F) and social consensus (SC) on competitive intelligence 
practitioners (CI). They used a between subjects design, where they administered two scenarios 
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each with different manipulations. The usage of CIs represented an important feature in this 
study. The authors argued that the competitive intelligence field is relatively new and ethical 
codes are not fully defined. Therefore, respondents will rely more on their personal moral scripts 
rather than scripts determined by the industry. One scenario was about mystery shoppers and the 
other about hiring. In the mystery shoppers' scenario, a middle level manager had to choose 
between recommending a mystery shopping project or not. In this project, a significant amount 
of money was given to CIs and they were asked to buy financial plans from competitors and 
extract as much information as they could. In the second scenario, a middle level manager had to 
decide between hiring two individuals, where both individuals had equal competencies; however, 
one of them had information about the business's competitors and was willing to share these 
information once hired. Both of these scenarios were considered by the researchers to be 
ethically ambiguous. An ambiguous setting would help the researcher to better identify what 
drove the respondent's ethical awareness. Both scenarios contained manipulations for MC and F. 
For MC they used low and high manipulations. For example, in the mystery shopper setting, they 
told the respondents that the competitors would go out of business in the high MC treatment, and 
in the low MC treatment they would increase their own profits while decreasing the competitors' 
profits. The framing manipulations consisted of wording manipulations, where some words were 
chosen to better trigger the moral cognitions. For SC and competitiveness, they administered a 
questionnaire. 
Butterfield et al. (2000), found significant support for the impact of MC and SC on 
ethical awareness. However, they found weak support for the impact of framing on ethical 
awareness. Interestingly; their findings related to the competitiveness hypothesis were in the 
opposite direction from the hypothesis. They predicted that competitiveness would mask their 
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moral cognitive framework and individuals would unquestioningly follow instructions given by 
the organizations. However, based on their findings, competitiveness increased moral awareness. 
Using an exploratory approach, Sparks and Hunt (1998) investigated the impact of 
organizational socialization, professional socialization, empathy, relativism and ethics training 
on ethical sensitivity. Organizational socialization is "the process by which a person learns the 
values, norms and behaviors which permit him [ or her] to function as a member of the 
organization" (Van 1976, p.67). Sparks and Hunt (1998) argued that the internalization of the 
organizational values should make the individual more ethically sensitive. In their findings, they 
reported a significant relationship between ethical sensitivity and organizational socialization. 
However, this finding is contradicted by findings reported by Shaub (1989), where he did not 
find a significant relationship between ethical sensitivity and organizational socialization. 
Sparks and Hunt (1998) also included professional socialization in their model. The 
authors argue that a higher professional socialization means a higher learning of professional 
values and norms. They hypothesized that a higher professional socialization should be 
associated with a higher level of ethical sensitivity. Their findings partially supported this 
hypothesis. They also tested for the relationship between empathy and ethical sensitivity. 
Empathy included perspective taking (the cognitive component of empathy) and emotional 
contagion (the affective dimension of empathy). They argued that higher empathy should 
generate higher ethical sensitivity. They found a significant relationship between perspective 
taking and ethical sensitivity, and no significant relationship between emotional contagion and 
ethical sensitivity. They concluded that the impact of empathy on ethical sensitivity was 
cognitive in nature. 
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Ethical training was the last independent variable in their model. Sparks and Hunt (1998) 
argued that more training would result in a higher awareness of ethical dilemmas. Surprisingly, 
in their analysis, they found a negative relationship between ethical sensitivity and ethical 
training. This contradicts the assumption that ethical awareness is learned. The authors argue that 
this reversed relationship may be due to ethics education that focuses on strengthening the 
individual's relativistic behavior. 
Sparks and Hunt (1998) argue that professionals should have higher ethical sensitivity 
than marketing students due to a higher exposure to ethical issues. They also argue that first year 
students will have lower ethical sensitivity than students in their final year. Those arguments are 
built upon the assumption that ethical sensitivity is a learning process and the more an individual 
learns about ethical dilemmas the more sensitive she becomes. Their results showed that there is 
a significant difference between practitioners and students. However, they found no difference 
between students in different years. Because this paper is exploratory in nature, we should be 
very careful interpreting the results. Research in ethical behavior showed that the individual's 
level of cognitive moral development (CMD) has an impact on ethical behavior (Green and 
Weber, 1997). The difference between marketing research practitioners and students' ethical 
sensitivity may be due to the difference in their CMD stage. It is possible that using the CMD 
approach provides a better explanation for the authors' findings. Students in the first and last 
year of their education may share the same CMD stage, which explains why they did not have a 
significant ethical sensitivity difference. Moreover, professionals may have a higher CMD stage 
than students and this also explains the results reported by the authors. 
Shaub (1993) investigated the relationship between idealism, relativism, organizational 
commitment, professional commitment and ethical sensitivity. His scenario contained three 
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ethical issues. Eighty percent of his sample recognized the first issue, 23% recognized the second 
issue and 42% recognized the third issue. He reported a negative relationship between idealism 
and ethical sensitivity, and relativism and ethical sensitivity. Shaub (1993) predicted a positive 
relationship between idealism and ethical sensitivity: "idealists will tend to focus on harm to 
others. To the extent that an idealist perceives that others will be harmed by someone's actions. 
He/she would be expected to recognize an issue as having ethical content" (Shaub, 1993 p.154). 
He reported his findings (a negative relationship) as surprising. He explained the deviation from 
the predicted outcome by the unpredicted focus of its respondents (respondents focused on the 
avoided harm rather than on the caused harm). Yetmar and Eastman (2000) define idealism as 
"the extent of an individual's concern with the welfare of others and how strongly the individual 
believes that harming others is always avoidable" (p .275). Therefore, highly idealistic 
individuals are concerned about the amount of harm associated with an action. They would 
spend more effort while assessing an ethical dilemma to avoid any possible harm to others. 
Karcher (1996) investigated the impact of specific factors on ethical sensitivity. She 
explored the nature of the issue, its severity, the respondents' age, their position and expertise, 
their prior exposure and their educational leveL Based on the results, age was a significant factor 
for recognizing an ethical issue. Older respondents had a higher level of ethical sensitivity. 
Interestingly, she could not support the relationship between the other factors listed above and 
ethical sensitivity. Based on her findings, employee position, previous exposure to similar ethical 
issues, degree level, gender and level of expertise did not have a significant relationship with 
ethical sensitivity. 
Yetmar and Eastman (2000) built upon Hunt and Vitell's (1986, 1993) model of ethical 
decision making and investigated the impact of role conflict, role ambiguity, job satisfaction, 
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relativism and professional commitment on ethical sensitivity. These factors map into three of 
the five factors defined by Hunt and Vitell: role conflict, job satisfaction and job ambiguity 
represented the organizational environment; relativism was used for personal characteristics; 
and, professional commitment for the professional environment. Cultural environment and 
industry environment were not examined in this study. They provided support for the 
relationship between role conflict and job satisfaction and ethical sensitivity. Role conflict had a 
negative relationship with ethical sensitivity, whereas job satisfaction was positively related. 
However, based on their results, no support was provided for the impact of relativism, 
professional commitment or role ambiguity on ethical sensitivity. 
Ameen et al. (1996) investigate the role gender plays in ethical sensitivity. The effect of 
gender could be analyzed using the socialization approach or the structural approach (Betz et al. 
(1989). The socialization approach suggests there will be a difference between men and women 
when it comes to ethical sensitivity. More precisely, the socialization approach is based on the 
differing values that males and females bring to the work place. Males are usually more 
competitive and are more likely to be willing to ignore the rules to achieve their objectives and 
females care more about work relationships and give more attention to the task. The structural 
approach posits no difference between males and females, since it argues that the reward system 
for ethical conduct should have an impact on both genders and therefore they would be similar. 
Ameen et al. (1996) adopted the socialization approach and argued that females should have a 
higher ethical sensitivity than males. Using accounting students as a sample, they distributed a 23 
item survey depicting ethical dilemmas students may face in their environment. The findings 
supported their hypothesis and provided evidence that females were significantly more ethically 
sensitive than males. 
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Using Shaub et al.'s (1993) instrument to measure ethical sensitivity, Chan and Leung 
(2006) investigate the relationship between ethical reasoning, personality factors and ethical 
sensitivity. Their personality factors included: ethical orientation (relativism and idealism), locus 
of control, age, gender and academic performance. They administered their instrument to 156 
accounting students in Hong Kong. They found no significant relationship between ethical 
sensitivity and ethical reasoning. Their finding supports Rest's (1986) theory by showing that 
high moral reasoning does not imply a better recognition of an ethical dilemma-those two steps 
in the model appear to be independent as posited by Rest. More interestingly,. they found a 
significant relationship between locus of control and ethical sensitivity. 
The concept of locus of control comes from Rotter's (1954) social learning theory. In his 
book, he explains that individuals behave in a certain way to satisfy an expected reinforcement 
He pointed out that this attitude is determined by the individual's perception of her own 
influence on the outcome of the desired reinforcement. More precisely, some individuals may 
think that they control their destiny when others do not. Rotter (1966 .p 1) defines Locus of 
Control as: "when a reinforcement is perceived by the subject as following some action of his 
own but not being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our culture, it is typically 
perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, or as 
unpredictable because of the great complexity of the forces surrounding him. When an individual 
interprets the events in this way, we have labeled this a belief in external control. If the person 
perceives that the event is contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively permanent 
characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal control." 
Chan and Leung (2006) find that "internal" accounting students were better at 
recognizing an ethical issue than "external" accounting students. However, among all personality 
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factors, locus of control was the only personality trait that significantly correlated with ethical 
sensitivity. No support was found for ethical orientation, age, gender or academic performance. 
Lau (2010) investigates the relationship between ethics education, ethical awareness and 
moral reasoning. Her findings show that ethics education improves students' ethical sensitivity 
and moral reasoning. 
C. Empirical Studies of Moral Intensity: 
Jones (1991) argued that individuals respond to the intensity of the moral issue and not 
just to the issue itself. Jones proposed six characteristics of moral intensity (Table 3). 
Some research studies have (e.g., McMahon and Harvey, 2006; Frey, 2000) investigated 
the dimensions of Jones' (1991) moral intensity. For example, Singhapakdi (1996) tested Jones' 
(1991) theoretical model empirically by testing the relationship between moral intensity and 
ethical perception (using four ethical scenarios). They tested the dimensions of the moral 
intensity using an orthogonal rotation. All of the responses related to moral intensity loaded on 
two factors. The first factor included MC, PE, TI, and CE and was labeled the "perceived 
potential harm! no harm" dimension. The second dimension included SC and PX and it was 
labeled "perceived social pressure". These results held for three out of four scenarios, the last 
scenario produced only one factor. Using regression analysis, they showed that both of these 
dimensions were significant determinants of ethical perception. Overall, their results provide 
empirical support for Jones' (1991) model: moral intensity is a determinant of ethical perception. 
31 
Table.3: Jones' Moral intensity characteristics 
Moral Intensity Definition Examples 
An act that causes 1,000 people to suffer a particular injury is of 
The sum of the harms (or greater magnitude of consequence than an act that causes 10 
MC: Magnitude benefits) done to victims (or people to suffer the same injury (p. 374) 
of Consequences beneficiaries) of the moral An act that causes the death of human being is of greater 
act in question" (p. 374) magnitude of consequence than an act that causes a person to 
suffer a minor injury (p. 374) 
The evil involved in discriminating against minority job 
candidates has greater social consensus than the evil involved in 
The degree of social refusing to act affirmatively on behalf of minority job SC: Social candidates. (p. 375) 
Consensus agreement that a proposed The evil involved in bribing a customs official in Texas has 
act is evil (or good). (p. 375) greater social consensus than the evil involved in bribing a 
customs official in Mexico. (Nehemkis, 1975 as cited in Jones, 
1991, p. 375) 
A joint function of the Producing a vehicle that would be dangerous to occupants during routine driving maneuvers has greater probability of 
probability that the act in harm than producing a vehicle that endangers occupants only 
PE: Probability of question will actually take during rear-end collisions. (p. 375) 
Effect place and the act in question 
will actually cause the harm Selling a gun to a known armed robber has greater probability 
(benefit) predicted. (p. 375) of harm than selling gun to a law-abiding citizen (p.375) 
Releasing a drug that will cause 1 percent of the people who 
The length of time between 
take it to have acute nervous reactions soon after they take it has 
greater temporal immediacy than releasing a drug that will 
the present and the onset of cause 1 percent of those who take it to develop nervous 
TI: Temporal consequences of the moral disorders after 20 years. (p.376) 
Immediacy act in question (shorter Reducing the retirement benefits of current retirees has greater length of time implies 
greater immediacy). (p. 376) temporal immediacy than reducing retirement benefits of 
employees who are currently between 40 and 50 years of age. 
(p.376) 
The feeling of nearness Layoffs in a person's work unit have greater moral proximity 
(social, cultural, (physical and psychological) than do layoffs in a remote plant. 
psychological, or physical) (p.376) 
PX: Proximity . that the moral agent has for For U.S citizens, the sale of dangerous pesticides in U:S 
victims (geneficiaries) of the markets has greater moral proximity (social, cultural, and 
evil (beneficial) act in physical) than does the sale of such pesticides in Latin America. 
question. (p. 376) (p.376) 
A change in a warranty policy denying coverage to 10 people 
with claims of $ 10,000 has a more concentrated effect than a 
CE: An inverse function of the change denying coverage to 10,000 people with claims of 
Concentration of number of people affected $10.00. (p. 377) 
Effect by an act of given Cheating an individual or small group of individuals out of a 
magnitude. (p. 377) given sum has a more concentrated effect than cheating an 
institutional entity, such as a corporation or government agency, 
out of the same sum. (p.377/378) 
*Information in this table was taken from Jones (1991). 
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Frey (2000) also investigated the dimensionality of moral intensity and reported two 
different dimensions. The fIrst dimension included; MC, SC, PE, PX and TI and the second one 
included CEo However, their stability analysis (they split the sample in two halves) showed that 
TI, CE and PX where unstable. Based on those results, they argued that moral intensity is largely 
encompassed in one dimension, with MC, SC and PE being the most important aspects of the 
construct. Moreover, McMahon and Harvey (2006) investigated this dimensionality in a series of 
studies. In the first study, they used an exploratory factor analysis to develop moral intensity 
factor loadings. The results were then further tested in a second study (using a confirmatory 
factor analysis). Based on their results, moral intensity loaded on three factors. The fIrst factor is 
"magnitude of consequences" and contains MC, PE, TI, the second factor is "proximity" (PX) 
and the third factor is "social consensus" (SC). MC and SC were always found to be significant 
in all of those studies, but they loaded on different factors when the study reported more than one 
factor loading. A consensus has been reached in the literature that magnitude of consequences 
and social consensus are important components of moral intensity (Waldron, 2009; Q'Fallen and 
Butterfield, 2005; McMahon and Harvey 2006). 
D. Multi-Dimensional Ethical Scale (MES) Literature: 
A significant research stream has developed based on an instrument called the Multi-
Dimensional Ethical Scale (MES), originally intended to measure ethical orientation. Reidenbach 
and Robin (1988) argued that studies in descriptive ethics to date had relied solely on two moral 
philosophies: deontology and utilitarianism. Due to the pluralistic nature of moral philosophy, 
they followed Beauchamp and Bowie (1983), and Donaldson and Werhane (1983) and argued 
that other moral philosophies such as relativism, egoism and justice should be considered. They 
developed a 29 item scale including all five moral philosophies. They asked subjects to read 
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three scenarios and to state how important each philosophical dimension was in evaluating the 
ethical act. They found that subjects did not use only one dimension. In all scenarios, subjects 
relied on several different moral philosophies, which provided support for considering more 
philosophical theories in research regarding ethical decision making. Importantly, the 
philosophies used changed from one scenario to another, suggesting that the evaluation criteria 
for each ethical dilemma is situational (varies from one situation to another). 
Based on the dimensions identified above, Reidenbach and Robin (1990) created the 33 
item MES. They added two questions: one for the subjective probability that the respondent 
would take the action, and one for assessing the ethicality of the action. The instrument was 
tested on a sample of managers. Factor analysis revealed three factors: a moral equity factor 
(containing justice, relativistic and deontological dimensions), a relativistic factor and a 
contractualism factor. As shown, one of the relativistic questions loaded on the moral equity 
factor. This is due to a difference in perception of one of the questions ( the dilemma is 
"acceptable/not acceptable to my family") While constructing the survey, the judges predicted 
this question would belong to the relativistic dimension, however, the factor loading shows that 
the respondents did not perceive it as relativistic. The moral equity dimension contains three 
moral philosophies, which the authors believed to be general knowledge regarding what is right 
and wrong. The relativistic dimension shows that ethical beliefs are relative to cultural and social 
learning. The contractualism dimension is solely deontological, which the authors describe as a 
social contract between individuals and society. Results from each dimension were regressed on 
both ethical perception and ethical intent (as measured by the two final questions. The results 
showed that on average these dimensions explained 34% of the variation in individuals' intention 
to behave ethically. 
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Flory et al. (1992) applied Reidenbach and Robin's (1988, 1990) MES in an accounting 
context where they used four accounting scenarios. The results supported the generalizability of 
Reidenbach and Robin's (1990) results with the responses to the four scenarios loading on the 
same three factors; moral equity, relativism and cohtractualism. The MES explains why 
accountants perceive an issue as ethical or not and it also explains a proportion of their intention 
to commit an ethical act. However, it is important to mention that the MES does not fully explain 
the complexity of the ethical decision dynamic. It only explains a reasonable proportion of it. 
Moreover, the argument behind the use of the MES is that morality is situational and cannot be 
uniform. More precisely, the results of administering the MES will vary depending on the 
scenario or the ethical conflict. Flory et al. (1992), in their concluding remarks, invite other 
researchers to use this scale in various contexts in order to better understand the dynamics of 
accountants' ethical decision making. Due to the large number of possible situational scenarios, 
it would be very difficult and time consuming to replicate the MES in all different situations. In 
addition, as more scenarios are added, the MES becomes increasingly longer and more difficult 
to administer due to its length. Without a more complete testing of scenarios, the results are not 
uniquely explained by the theory. Jones and Ponemon (1993 p.4ll), criticized Flory et al.'s study 
and argued that their MES fails to answer the question "What makes an accountant more or less 
ethical?" Moreover they explain two weaknesses: the absence of psychological theories and an 
over reported reliability. Jones and Ponemon argue that Flory et al.'s analysis fails to consider 
individual differences such as beliefs and values: the uniformity of these psychometric 
characteristics represents a significant flaw in the paper. Jones andPonemon (1993) also 
suggested a reliability bias due to sampling and design issues. They argue that subjects used in 
this study were not randomly assigned and therefore they were highly homogeneous. Moreover, 
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the way the survey was designed likely resulted in low disagreement between subjects because 
most of their subjects are most likely aware of the ethical issues, causing them to converge 
toward the extremes. They also argue that the social desirability response bias issue still existed 
because of the role playing context. 
Cohen et al. (1993) argued that the utilitarian dimension should be considered separately 
and was not captured by Flory et al.'s study (1992) because of their sample characteristics. Flory 
et al.' s sample consisted of accountants from south eastern United States, and was thus not 
culturally diversified. Cohen et al. (1993) used the MES with a culturally diverse sample 
(members of the international section of the American Accounting Association), to whom they 
administered a total of six accounting and marketing scenarios. Their results showed the 
emergence of the utilitarianism factor in some, but not all, of the vignettes, which may represent 
some of the missing variability in Flory et al.'s (1992) study. Their study also supports the 
generalizability of the MES since factor loadings were similar in the marketing and accounting 
context. 
Cohen et al. (1996) continued to investigate the appropriateness of the inclusion of the 
utilitarian dimension in the MES. Their results showed that the utilitarian dimension loaded in all 
of the vignettes used in the study and, in one vignette, explained more variance than the 
relativistic dimension. Based on those results, they argue that the utilitarian dimension plays an 
important role in the ethical decision-making dynamic. Moreover, they posit that the MES might 
be used in a different manner to measure ethical awareness. They use fairness as a measure for 
recognition of ethical issues. "A respondent that identifies an action as fair has recognized no 
ethical (defined as fairness) problem in the action, while a response that the action is unfair 
recognizes that the action is unethical (defined as fairness)" (Cohen et al. 1996 p.107). The 
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problem here is the assumption behind the relationship between fairness and aWareness. There is 
no support for such a relationship. Moreover, individuals may recognize an unethical issue and 
consider it as fair. Cohen et al. (1996) also attempted to measure moral development stage using 
the MES. They speculate that individuals with high cognitive moral development will score high 
on specific dimensions such as individual rights, justice and ethical principles and individuals 
with lower cognitive moral development would score high on the approval of others or 
respecting authorities. Using a regression analysis, they examined the relationship of the MES 
dimensions with ethical evaluation. Their results indicated that those relationships were not 
consistent across vignettes. More precisely, depending on the vignette, particular dimensions had 
different degrees of influence (which matches with Trevino's (1986) argument about the 
situational characteristic of ethical responses). 
Shawver et al. (2008) used the MES to explore corporate governance and whistle blowing 
characteristics of professional accountants using the same scenarios used in Cohen et al. (1996). 
Their factor loadings showed three different factors. The first factor included two items from 
fairness scales and two items from deontology scales. This differs from Cohen et al.'s (1996) 
moral equity dimension, which included two fairness items, one deontological item, and one 
relativistic item. Shawver et al.'s (2008) second factor had two relativistic items, one utilitarian 
item and one deontological item. However, Cohen et al.'s (1996) second factor (relativistic) 
included two items from the relativistic scales. Finally, Cohen's et al. (1996) contractualism 
dimension included two deontological items, where Shawver et al. (2008) reported one 
relativistic item, and one utilitarian item. Both of those studies used the same scenarios and 
distributed them to professional accountants~ The difference between the reported results creates 
doubt about the reliability of the MES to capture how accountants approach an ethical issue. 
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Previous studies that used the MES defended the inconsistency between vignettes due to the 
situational characteristics of the ethical dilemmas. However , when comparing both of these 
studies, the situational aspect of ethical dilemmas is controlled by the use of the same scenarios 
and similar subjects. In another study, Shawver et al: (2007) used the same vignettes used by 
Cohen et al. (1996) and distributed them to accounting students. Interestingly, the deontological 
dimension was not significant in this sample. These inconsistencies jeopardize claims about the 
reliability of the MES. These results indicate that the MES may not be a comprehensive measure 
for accountant's ethical behavior. 
E. Anti-Intellectualism Literature (AI): 
Hofstadter (1963, pg.7) defined anti-intellectualism as the: "resentment and suspicions of 
the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly 
to minimize the value of that life". Shaffer (1981), in differentiating between recipe knowledge 
(a concept he borrowed from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann' s influential book: The Social 
Construction of Reality (1967)) and traditional knowledge defines anti-intellectualism as "an 
extension of recipe knowledge" (Shaffer, 1981 .pg. 71). Berger and Luckmann (1967) illustrate 
recipe knowledge using the following example: 
... 1 use the telephone every day for specific pragmatic purposes of my own. 1 know how to do this. 1 also know what to 
do if my telephone fails to function - which does not mean that 1 know how to repair it, but that 1 know whom to call on for 
assistance ... All of this telephonic lore is recipe knowledge since it does not concern anything except what 1 have to know for my 
present and possible future pragmatic purposes. 1 am not interested in why the telephone works this way, in the enormous body of 
scientific and engineering knowledge that makes it possible to construct telephones. Nor, am 1 interested in uses of the telephone 
that lie outside my purposes, say in combination with short-wave radio for the purpose of marine communication. Similarly I 
have recipe knowledge of the workings of human relationships. (p. 42) 
Shaffer (1981) distinguishes between these types of knowledge using four characteristics: 
memorization (traditional knowledge focuses on understanding rather than memorizing while 
recipe knowledge focuses on memorization), certainty (traditional knowledge allows individuals 
to question certain things and nothing becomes an indubitable truth while under recipe 
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knowledge things are not subject to questioning), transcendental versus experiential 
(transcendental knowledge goes beyond concrete experiences; experiential knowledge includes 
the perceived facts of the situation) and personal versus impersonal. Shaffer (1981 pg. 75) 
defines an intellectual and anti-intellectual person in the following way: "an 'intellectual' in 
some sense steps outside the daily life to study non-routine problems, and evaluates the world of 
culture or expression in terms of some subordinate values. From this point of view, a person who 
holds the pragmatic motive and demands the education conform to relevance is profoundly anti-
intellectual. " 
Previous literature on anti-intellectualism has questioned whether we should consider 
anti-intellectualism to be a personality trait (Howley, 2002; Eigenberger, 2002). Eigenberger and 
Sealander (2001) suggested that anti-intellectualism is a heritable trait related to "openness to 
experience". Howley (2002) argues that intellectualism is, in some ways, related to intelligence 
which, in turn, is still not clearly defined as a personality trait or something else. For this reason, 
Howley (2002) argues that we should be very careful when formulating assumptions about anti-
intellectualism as a personality trait. Eigenberger (2002) responded to Howley (2002), 
articulating the difference between intellectualism and intelligence. He defined anti-
intellectualism as: "more a characteristic and stylistic way of expressing or applying one's 
intelligence" (Eigenberger, 2002 pg. 593). This debate in the literature cautions us to be careful 
when we link anti-intellectualism to personality traits. 
Rosen (1964), while measuring cognition motivation, found that a student's level of 
intellectualism had a significant impact on seven out of the twelve scales he used. Rosen's 
(1964) sample contained three different groups: high, medium and low depending on the 
academic program in which the students were enrolled. The assumption was that choice of 
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college program reflected more than cognitive motivations. Interestingly, Rosen (1964) found 
that individuals can be socially anti-intellectual but not religiously anti-intellectual. Moreover, 
subjects from the high group (honors program) had a lower level of social anti-intellectualism 
than students in the low group. Rosen (1964) explored anti-intellectualism from a social/religious 
perspective while other researchers have tried to break down anti-intellectual into more detailed 
components. For instance, Rigney (1991) refined Hofstadter's work and identified three sources 
of anti-intellectualism 1) religious anti-rationalism; 2) populist anti-elitism; and 3) unreflective 
instrumentalism. Each source represents a different form of anti-intellectual perspective. 
Religious anti-rationalism represents warm emotion versus cold reason and absolutism versus 
relativism. Based on this source, an anti-intellectual individual is more emotional than an 
intellectual who is considered cold in emotions. Further, within this source anti-intellectualism 
would be strongly related to absolutism (the acceptance of facts without questioning them) and 
weakly related to relativism (everything could be questioned). Populist anti-elitism arises from 
the tension between intellectuals and elitists (Rigney, 1991). In this context, elitists are privileged 
people holding an important political position and intellectuals are individuals with superior 
knowledge. Anti-elitism results in depriving intellectuals of holding elite positions in society 
(democratization of the intellect). Unreflective instrumentalism does not consider as worthwhile 
ideas that don't have an immediate result or are not practical. In this context, an idea is practical 
exclusively if it is useful for problem solving. In essence, unreflective instrumentalism would not 
consider any knowledge that does not serve as an immediate input into solving problems 
(Rigney, 1991). 
Eigenberger and Sealander (2001) created a 25-item scale to measure students' anti-
intellectualism. This scale was validated by comparing results to the Openness to Experience 
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· scale of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 1992), the 
Inventory of Learning Process (Schmeck, et al., 1977), the California Critical Thinking Skill Test 
(Facione, 1990), the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), the 
shortened version of Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (1996) and a shortened 
version of Altemeyer's Dogmatism scale (1996). The Cronbach alpha was highly significant (a = 
.890) indicating that this scale has a high level of reliability. In addition, the scale correlated in 
the expected manner with other measures, providing evidence of its construct validity. Howley 
(2002) argues that Eigenberger and Sealander's (2001) scale for anti-intellectualism may have 
some limitations based on the assumption that if anti-intellectualism is a cultural phenomenon, 
then intellectuals will represent a minority and most students, teachers and employers will be 
anti-intellectuals. Eigenberger (2002) responded to Howley (2002) and agreed that the anti-
intellectualism scale may contain some limitations. However, this scale is now used across 
disciplines to study phenomena related to anti-intellectualism (Hook, 2004; Laverghetta et al., 
2007; Elias, 2008, 2009). 
Hook (2004) used the anti-intellectualism scale with the student's adjustment scale 
(based on the four elements identified by Baker and Siryk (1999) - academic adjustment, 
attachment to an institution of learning, social adjustment, and emotional adjustment) to 
investigate the relationship between student's adjustment to college and anti-intellectualism. He 
found a negative relationship between anti-intellectualism and students' adjustment to college. 
Moreover, he reported that anti-intellectualism is unrelated to the social and personal-emotional 
adjustment subscales of the student adaptation to college questionnaire. 
Laverghetta et al. (2007) measured the correlation between political conservatism and 
anti-intellectualism and found a positive correlation (r=.37, p<.03) between anti-intellectualism 
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and political conservatism. Surprisingly, Laverghetta et aL (2007) found that graduate students 
scored significantly lower on the scale than first year university students. 
Elias (2008) investigated the relationship between anti-intellectualism and self-efficacy. 
He found that students' levels of anti-intellectualism varied depending on their major 
(undeclared, accounting, management and marketing), their year in school (freshmen, 
sophomores, junior, senior and graduate) and whether they are traditional or non-traditional 
students (non- traditional students are students who are older than 25). Elias (2008) found that 
non-traditional students had a lower level of anti-intellectualism than traditional students, 
freshmen and sophomores had a score similar to graduate students and higher than juniors and 
seniors, undeclared majors had the highest score followed by accounting, management, 
marketing and economics. Elias (2008) also reported that GPA was negatively related to anti-
intellectualism. 
Elias (2009) extended his study to investigate the impact of anti-intellectualism and 
academic self-efficacy on business students' perceptions of cheating. His study was similar to the 
study done by Smyth et aL (2004) on the perception of dishonesty among two-year college 
students. Elias' (2009) results showed students that scored higher on the anti-intellectualism 
scale were more likely to view cheating as acceptable. Based on these results he concluded that 
instructors should work on reducing anti-intellectualism among students and employers should 
consider the level of anti-intellectualism of applicants during the hiring process. This is based on 
the assumption that students, as future professionals, will carry this behavior to their work place. 
F. Machiavellianism Literature: 
Hunt and Chonko (1984, p.30) define Machiavellianism as a"negative epithet, indicating 
at least an amoral (if not immoral) way of manipulating others to accomplish one's objectives". 
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A Machiavellian administrator is "one who employs aggressive, manipulative, exploiting, and 
devious moves in order to achieve personal and organizational objectives." (Calhoon, 1969 
p.211). Christie and Geis (1970) considered Machiavellianism to be a personality trait and 
constructed a 20-item scale to capture individual differences based on their level of 
Machiavellianism. This scale is known as the Mach IV scale and is used in most of the studies 
that explore Machiavellianism. The scale contains three categories: machiavellian tactics (9 
items), views of human nature (9 items), and abstract morality (2 items). Theoretical scores in 
the Mach IV scale range from 40 to 160, with 100 as the neutral benchmark. Individuals who 
score above (below) 100 have high (low) levels of Machiavellianism. In order to explore the 
individual differences based on different levels of Machiavellianism, Christie and Geis (1970) 
reported the results of 38 studies which used the Mach 4 scale. Their general conclusion was 
"high Machs manipulate more, win more, are persuaded less, persuade others more, and 
otherwise differ significantly from low Machs." These differences occur in situations in which 
"subjects interact face to face with others, when the situation provides latitude for improvisation, . 
. . and in situations in which affective involvement with details irrelevant to winning distracts 
low Machs" (p. 312). 
Research showed that Machiavellianism has an impact on ethical behavior. Jones and 
Kavanagh (1996) investigated the relationship between Machiavellianism and ethical behavior 
and found that individuals who scored high on the Mach IV scale were more likely to behave 
unethically than individuals with lower levels of Machiavellianism. Interestingly, they found a 
significant negative correlation between Machiavellianism and social desirability. Individuals 
with low Machiavellianism had a higher score in social desirability than individuals with high 
Machiavellianism. 
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Singhapakdi and Vitell (1990) investigated the impact of a code of ethics, 
Machiavellianism and locus of control on ethical decision making. They used two scenarios 
representing two types of organizations: an organization that has a reinforced code of ethics and 
an organization that doesn't have a code of ethics and its manager is involved in unethical 
behavior. Their findings indicated that ethical policies and Machiavellianism had an association 
with perceived ethical problems (ethical awareness). They reported a negative correlation 
between Machiavellianism and perceived ethical problems. Individuals with low 
Machiavellianism seem to consider ethical problems more seriously than individuals with high 
Machiavellianism. The regression analysis for punitive actions showed a positive relationship 
with Machiavellianism. Individuals with high Machiavellianism are less likely to favor non-
punitive actions. 
Rayburn and Rayburn (1996) explored the relationship among certain personality traits 
(type A personality and Machiavellianism), gender, and ethical behavior (using participants' 
responses to 27 ethical statements) for a sample of 123 undergraduate students. Using the Mach 
IV scale, they classified individuals into two categories: Machiavellian (individuals who scored 
80 and above) and Non-Machiavellian (individuals who score below 80). Their results showed 
that Machiavellians are less likely to be ethically oriented than Non-Machiavellians. It should be 
noted that these authors chose a cutoff slightly below that recommended by Christie and Geis 
(1970). 
Verbeke et al. (1996) investigated the relationship between Machiavellianism and ethical 
decision making for salespeople. Their results showed a significant negative path between 
Machiavellianism and ethical decision making. Moreover, they reported that an organization 
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with a strong ethical climate attracted individuals with low Machiavellianism (Cronbach alpha = 
.670). 
Bass et al. (1999) investigated the impact of ethical ideology, Machiavellianism, locus of 
control and just world belief on ethical judgment and intention to behave unethically. They used 
the MES to measure ethical judgment and intention. For their purposes they used two scenarios 
distributed to members of the American Marketing Association (AMA). Results from the first 
scenario supported the predicted positive relationships between Machiavellianism and both 
ethical judgment and ethical intentions. However, in the second scenario, the relationship 
between Machiavellianism and ethical judgment was not significant (the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and ethical intentions was supported). Respondents rated scenario one as 
portraying the more unethical action. This may explain the absence of the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and ethical judgment in the second scenario. Variations in moral intensity 
produced different results. The findings supported Jones' (1991) theory; moral intensity should 
be taken into consideration when studying mechanisms of ethical decision making. 
Research on accountants' level of Machiavellianism is limited. Wakefield (2008), using 
the Mach IV scale, compared accountants' scores on Machiavellianism to other scores reported 
in previous studies (purchasing managers, Hong Kong managers, college students, community 
college teachers, specialty store managers, sales professionals, marketers, adults, U.S managers, 
Hong Kong bankers, U.S bankers, school superintendents). His sample included CPAs from 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. He found that accountants scored the lowest after school 
superintendents (the average score was 80.9). Christie and Geis (1970) defined a neutral 
benchmark for Machiavellianism equal to 100. An average score of 80.9 showed that CPAs are 
characterized by low Machiavellianism. Wakefield (2008) explored the relationship between 
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Machiavellianism and age, gender, education, income, position, job satisfaction, career 
satisfaction and to accountants' ethical ideology. His results supported the relationship between 
education and career satisfaction. Accountants with higher education had a higher level of 
Machiavellianism. Accountants with higher levels of Machiavellianism seemed to have lower 
career satisfaction. Wakefield (2008) also explored the relationship between ethical ideology and 
Machiavellianism. Ethical ideology includes two factors: idealism and relativism. These two 
factors are theorized to playa key role when an individual is approaching a moral issue. 
Relativism (idealism) describes individuals that are more likely to reject (accept) moral absolutes 
when assessing the ethicality of a moral issue. His results showed a negative relationship of 
Machiavellianism with idealism and a positive relationship with relativism. Specifically, high 
Mach accountants are more relativistic than low Mach accountants, and high Mach accountant 
are less idealistic than low Mach accountants. 
G. Relativism and Idealism Literature: 
Schlenker and Forsyth (1977) argue that idealism and relativism are two factors able to 
explain variation in individuals' judgment when they face a moral issue. Relativistic individuals 
represent those who are more likely to reject moral absolutes, and believe, instead, that what is 
ethical depends on the situation. Specifically, those individuals think of moral issues as 
situational and every situation has its own set of codes. No code can encompass all situations. 
Highly idealistic individuals are those who believe that harm can be avoided by making the 
correct decision and therefore are less likely to recognize negative outcomes that may result from 
such decisions. Table 4 presents Forsyth's (1980) four theoretical ethical types that result from 
the interaction between relativism and idealism: 
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Table 4: Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies 
Idealism Relativism High Low 
Situationalists Absolutists 
Rejects moral rules: advocates Assumes that the best possible High outcome can always be individualistic analysis of each 
achieved by following 
act in each situation 
universal moral rules 
Subjectivists Exceptionists 
Appraisals based on personal Moral absolutes guide 
Low values and perspective rather judgments but pragmatically 
than universal moral open to exceptions to these 
principals standards; utilitarian. 
From Forsyth (1980, p 176) 
Forsyth (1980) developed the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) instrument to capture 
these two factors. The EPQ has 10 items to capture relativism and 10 items to capture idealism. 
Scores from this scale will differentiate between relativistic and idealistic individuals. 
Combining both scores together will allow the researcher to assign an ethical ideology from the 
above table to individuals. 
Bass et al. (1999) investigated the impact of ethical ideology on ethical judgment and 
intention to behave unethically. They found a significant negative relationship between idealism 
and ethical judgment. Results with respect to the relationships between idealism and behavioral 
intentions, relativism and ethical judgment, relativism and behavioral intention were not 
supported. Specifically, they found that highly idealistic individuals are less likely to consider 
questionable ethical issues as acceptable. 
Shaub (1993) investigated the relationship between relativism, idealism and ethical 
sensitivity. The significant findings (p < .01) supported a negative relationship between 
relativism and ethical sensitivity. This result is as expected, since highly relativistic individuals 
are less likely to accept moral absolutes, and therefore are less likely to follow a code of ethical 
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conduct. The results also partially supported the negative relationship between ethical sensitivity 
and idealism (p < .053). Similar findings were reported by Sparks and Hunt (1998). 
HI. SCALE DEVELOPMENT: 
Within the ethical decision making literature there is a lack of research on ethical 
sensitivity (0' Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). The literature also points out the measurement 
issues related to ethical awareness and the situational nature of ethical dilemmas. Further, 
research in accountant's ethical sensitivity (Karcher, 1996; Cohen et al., 2001; Fleischman and 
Valentine, 2003; Valentine and Fleischman, 2003) is very limited and inconclusive. In this paper, ' 
I propose and test a new measure of accountants' ethical sensitivity that considers the limitation 
in previous research. In the table below, I present the accounting studies of ethical sensitivity 
with the limitations found for each study. The limitations examined are: 
1. The use of a limited number of vignettes (the use of few vignettes limits the 
generalizability of findings and conclusions, since the conclusions are drawn from 
specific scenarios or context administered to the participants) 
2. The lack of dimensionality (unless we can group certain items into a dimension, we 
cannot generalize or predict ethical sensitivity) 
3. The lack of balancing unethical issues with ethical issues (some studies focused only 
on unethical issues and did not give the participant a chance to identify an ethical 
issue), 
4. The exclusion of the moral intensity factor proposed by Jones (1991) (research on 
ethics has shown the importance of moral intensity in all of the steps of the ethical 
decision process), 
5. The failure to control for social desirability bias (the lack of this control jeopardize 
the reliability of the findings). 
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While not a limitation, as such, the lack of studies employing a Canadian sample is also a 
concern. There is no reason to suppose that results generated in other countries and other 
cultures will generalize to the Canadian environment. Further the one study that uses a Canadian 
sample, Cohen et al. (2001), targeted accountants working in the "Big Five Canada", and thus is 
limited to one professional body in Canada (CAs). 
Table 5: Studies and Limitations 
Used a 
separate Mixed The The use instrument Included ethical instrument of Paper Journal Year Sample Acctg to control moral and has multiple multiple for social intensity unethical 
desirability items dimensions vignettes 
bias 
Ameen et al. JBE 1996 U.S. '-I x x x x '-I 
Karcher JBE 1996 U.S. '-I x '-I '-I x x 
Cohen et al. BRA 1996 Canada '-I x x x '-I x 
Yetmarand JBE 2000 U.S. '-I '-I '-I Eastman x x x 
Cohen et al. JBE 2001 Canada '-I x x x '-I x 
Fleischman 
and JBE 2003 U.S. '-I '-I x x x x 
Valentine 
Valentine 
and JBE 2003 U.S. '-I '-I x x x x 
Fleischman 
Chan and MAJ 2006 Hong '-I Leung Kong x x x x x 
Shawver and JBE 2009 U.S. '-I '-I '-I Senetti x x x 
Current 20lO Canada '-I '-I '-I '-I '-I '-I 
study 
My Accountants' Ethical Sensitivity Scale has been created to overcome these limitations. 
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A. Accountant's Ethical Sensitivity Scale (AESS) development: 
a. Instruments'development: 
Most of the research on accountant's ethical sensitivity uses scenarios to capture ethical 
sensitivity (Shaub, 1993; Cohen et aI., 1996; Karcher, 1996). The use of scenarios is very 
convenient in ethics research because it has good external validity (reflects ethical issues in 
realistic frameworks). However, a weakness of this research design is that it provides findings 
only for specific ethical situations. Specifically, it tests for relationships between ethical 
sensitivity and independent variables in specific scenarios. In addition, even within the same 
study, results may vary across scenarios, (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2001) resulting 
in generalizability issues. Findings from prior research in ethical sensitivity provide a foundation 
for future development in the area. However, these findings are limited to the described 
scenarios. 
One of the purposes of this study is to create a measure of ethical sensitivity that is not 
limited to a particular context. My ethical sensitivity scale is inspired by an anchored ethical 
behavioral scale from the ethical performance appraisal literature in a working paper by Cardy 
and Selvarjan (2004). In their study, they use Bernardin and Beatty's (1984) behaviorally 
anchored rating scale (BARS) procedure to construct an anchored ethical behavior scale using 
the six dimensions from Akaah and Lund's (1994) research. Cardy and Selvarjan (2004) 
concluded with a 32-item questionnaire loading on the six dimensions (personal use, passing 
blame, bribery, falsification, padding expenses and deception) defined by Akaah and Lund 
(1994). 
Interestingly, none of these dimensions has been investigated in the accounting ethics 
literature although the dimensions tap issues that are applicable to most professions including the 
accounting profession. The dimensions exist in the professional work place and represent daily 
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moral issues. These dimensions allow me to explore ethical sensitivity from a broader 
perspective so I can assess accountant's ethical sensitivity in general. 
I begin by modifying some of the items introduced by Cardy and Selvarjan (2004) to 
make them more appropriate for an accounting context. I also add new items that are relevant to 
the accounting profession to each dimension. I generate these new items on the basis of a 
thorough review of the accounting ethics literature. Most of the items I add in this fashion are 
taken from scenarios that have been used in prior studies. The essential action from the scenario 
was used, without any of the contextual factors that are usual in scenario research (Cohen et al., 
1995b; Cohen et al., 1996; O'Leary and Pangemanan, 2007). Thus, my questionnaire includes 
items from previous accounting ethical literature, items from Cardy and Selvarjan (2004) and 
items that are developed in the first phase of the project (see below). 
I construct my instrument so each dimension includes items that clearly represent 
unethical actions, items that clearly represent ethical actions, and item that are ambiguous. I use 
Taylor's (1975 p. 1) definition of ethics: the "inquiry into the nature and grounds of morality 
where the term morality is taken to mean moral judgment, standards, and rules of conduct." This 
definition represents the basis of distinguishing the ethical from the unethical. Ethical items in 
my questionnaire are included in order to prevent respondents from assuming that all actions are 
unethical, thus strengthening the sensitivity of the instrument. A mixture between ethical and 
unethical items camouflages the purposes of my measures and ensures that the respondents are 
not only trying to show to what extent they are aware of the issue, but of its existence as well. 
Moreover, ethical items will ensure that the respondents read the questions carefully and 
provided an accurate response. The unethical and ambiguous questions will be used to measure 
the level of ethical awareness. 
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In addition to these considerations, I construct the instrument with attention to balancing 
the moral intensity of the items. Previous literature provides evidence that Jones (1991) moral 
intensity factors often load on two main factors: social consensus and magnitude of 
consequences (e.g., Frey, 2000; O'Fallen and Butterfield, 2005; McMahon and Harvey, 2006; 
Waldron, 2009). Including all six moral dimensions in my survey instrument would increase the 
complexity of the instrument and present a risk of confounding the measure of ethical sensitivity. 
For this reason, I include the two main factors that were supported by the literature (magnitude 
of consequences and social consensus). I design each question to include a high or low level of 
either magnitude of consequences or social consensus. 
Each dimension within the instrument has a balanced ethical setting. I include some 
unethical statements, ambiguous statements and some ethical statements. Furthermore, I 
balanced the use of the intensity factors by making sure that each dimension includes a mixture 
of MC and SC treatment. 
b. Pretest: 
The AESS targets accountants' ethical sensitivity. To confirm the relevance of the items 
to the accounting profession and to investigate the possibility that some important dimension or 
acts were omitted, 18 (six from each CAs, CMAs and CGAs) accountants who had been 
identified through personal contacts in the profession reviewed the instrument. The accountants 
were asked to assess the relevance of the listed issues to the accounting profession and to make 
any possible suggestions for improvement. This development phase allowed me to assess the 
external validity of my instrument. 
To pretest the internal validity of the AESS and check for anomalies, the AESS was 
administered to 48 fourth year accounting students. Due to the length of the AESS and the 
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limited number of observation, each dimension was factor analyzed separately. In this pretest 
phase, each dimension included six to seven items: two clearly unethical items, two ambiguous 
items and two ethical items. The ethical items were not included in the factor analysis because 
the AESS captures accountants' ability to recognize an unethical issue. Mter eliminating items 
that failed to load properly, the questions from each dimension loaded on a single factor with a 
minimum of three questions per dimension. The preliminary factor analysis was used to identify 
problematic items and to fix them. 
B. Hypotheses Related to Content Validity: 
Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between ethical sensitivity and the constructs chosen as 
criterion variables. The relationships between relativism, Machiavellianism and Idealism are 
established in the previous literature. Anti-Intellectualism is a new construct. 
t Relativism ~l Machiavellianism I r HI (-) H2 (-) 
F igure 2: Hypotheses Ethical 
Sensitivity 
H3(+) H4 (-) 
Idealism J Anti-Intellectualism I I 
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Relativism: 
Relativism defines the extent to which individuals are likely to accept or reject moral 
absolutes (Forsyth 1980). Highly relativistic individuals are less likely to rely on moral 
absolutes. Therefore, they do not pay much attention to any set of rules of ethical conduct since 
they do not believe in their applicability. More precisely, they wi11limit their knowledge and 
usage of those rules. This relationship was supported by previous research: highly relativistic 
individuals score low in ethical awareness (Shaub, 1993; Sparks and Hunt 1998). Based on 
previous findings, we predict a negative relationship between ethical awareness and relativism. 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between ethical sensitivity and relativism. 
Idealism: 
Literature on the relationship between idealism and ethical sensitivity is very limited. 
Shaub (1993) partially supported a negative relationship. However his results were in the 
opposite direction from his predictions. Yetmar and Eastman (2000) define idealistic individuals 
as individuals who believe that harm is always avoidable. Therefore, I argue that highly idealistic 
individuals are concerned about the amount of harm associated with an action and they will 
spend more effort assessing an ethical dilemma to avoid any possible harm to others. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between ethical sensitivity and idealism. 
Machiavellianism: 
Previous studies support a negative relationship between Machiavellianism and ethical 
behavior (Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1990; Jones and Kavanagh, 1996; Rayburn and Rayburn, 
1996; Verbeke et al., 1996; Bass et al., 1999). For example, Singhapakdi and Vitell (1990) 
showed that individuals with low Machiavellianism will consider ethical problems more 
seriously than individuals with high Machiavellianism. These findings tend to support the 
assumption that low Machiavellians are willing to spend more effort when facing an ethical 
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dilemma and therefore have a higher chance of recognizing the presence of an ethical issue. I 
predict a negative relationship between ethical awareness and Machiavellianism, meaning that 
individuals with low Machiavellianism will be more aware of an ethical- issue than individuals 
with high Machiavellianism. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between ethical awareness and Machiavellianism. 
Anti-Intellectualism: 
Elias (2008) found that accounting students scored the highest on the anti-intellectualism 
(AI) scale compared to students with undeclared majors. Further, Elias (2009) showed that 
individuals with high AI scores are less likely to perceive cheating as unethical. The preference 
for recipe knowledge over traditional knowledge that would be typical of someone with high AI 
may have an impact on accountants' behavior in their work place (Elias, 2009). Based on 
Shaffer's (1981) differentiation between traditional learning and recipe learning, a highly anti-
intellectual individual is less likely to question whether an act is ethical and to have a lower level 
of ethical understanding than individuals with a lower level of anti-intellectualism. These 
personal characteristics would handicap individuals in recognizing an ethical dilemma. I 
hypothesize that individuals with high AI are less likely than others to recognize an ethical issue. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between AI and ethical sensitivity. 
C. Supplemental analysis: 
Bernardi (2006) investigated differences in social desirability bias across cultures. In his 
investigation, he used Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimensions to explore differences in social 
desirability bias scores reported from 12 countries. Also, he investigated the difference between 
males and females across cultures. Based on reported gender differences (e.g., Beltramini et al., 
1984; Smith and Oakley, 1997), he predicted a difference in social desirability bias. Based on his 
findings, this difference was not consistent across countries. Countries such as Australia, China, 
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Ecuador, Ireland, South Africa,. Spain and the United States had a significant difference between 
male's and female's reported social desirability bias, where in countries such as Canada, Hong 
Kong and Japan the difference was not significant. Based on Bernardi's findings, there are no 
social desirability bias differences between Canadian males and females. 
H5: There is no significant gender difference regarding the social desirability bias 
between Canadian accountants .. 
IV. METHODOLOGY: 
Mter the development of the instrument was completed, the revised instrument was tested for 
reliability, validity, and construct validity. 
A. Subjects: 
Previous research in accountant's ethical sensitivity was mostly conducted in the United 
States (Karcher, 1996; Fleischman and Valentine, 2003; Valentine and Fleischman, 2003). 
Research for Canadian accountants' ethical sensitivity is very limited (Cohen et al., 2001) and 
did not target all accounting designations. Participants from the three Canadian accounting 
professional organizations would be the ideal subjects. However, due to difficulties and long 
timelines to work with these organizations, I use university students in this studyl. The students 
received class participation credit for completing all of the questionnaires (AESS, EPQ (Forsyth, 
1980), M-C-Form C (Reynold, 1982), AI (Eigenberger and Sealander, 2001) and MACH IV 
(Christie and Geis, 1970». I recognize that students are not ideal subjects, however; previous 
research showed that a connection exists between professionals and students (Sims, 1993). In 
addition, Rest (1993) argues that cognitive moral development does not significantly differ after 
1 _I am working with representatives from all three professional groups to include practicing accountants in a 
further test of the AESS. 
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college. Therefore, students seem to be an initially reliable representation of professionals' 
ethical behavior. 
B. Sample: 
Students were offered participation credit for completing the questionnaire, which 
mitigated the possibility of a self-selection bias in the data. I received 218 completed surveys. 
Some of the surveys had missing observations (some students skipped or overlooked a question 
or two). Due to the low number of observations and the exploratory nature of this study, I did not 
exclude these observations from the sample. I replaced missing observations with a neutral 
response as an unbiased observation. 
Table 6 below reports the demographics of my final sample. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
N Percent Min Max Avg Std Age Age Age Deviation 
Female 100 45.9 18 29 21.91 2.543 
Male 118 54.1 18 48 22.01 4.76 
C. Control for Social Desirability: 
The inclusion of a social desirability measure in ethics research is supported in the literature 
(Fernandes and Randall, 1992). Recent research (Wakefield, 2008) in accounting concluded that 
professional accountants are characterized by a low level of Machiavellianism. In addition, Jones 
and Kavanagh (1996) found a strong negative correlation between Machiavellianism and social 
desirability. Thus, it is possible that responses from accountants, more than those from other 
groups, will suffer from social desirability response bias. Several other accounting studies in 
ethical sensitivity controlled for the social desirability bias (e.g., Cohen et al. 1996; Yetmar and 
Eastman 2000). 
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Social desirability can be measured directly by administering a Social Desirability Scale or 
indirectly by measuring the "Halo Effect". The "Halo Effect" is measured by calculating the 
difference between what the individual reports he would do and what he believes his peers would 
do. For example, after reading a scenario with an ethical dilemma, researchers ask the 
respondents to rate on 7 -point likert scale their subjective probability of committing the same act. 
Then, the respondent is asked the probability that one of their peers would engage in this activity 
based on the same 7 -point Likert scale. The difference between the two scores is known as the 
"Halo Effect". Tyson (1990) found that respondents always reported themselves as more ethical 
than their peers. Research in accountant ethical sensitivity (e.g., Cohen et al. 1996) uses the 
"Halo Effect" as a measure of social desirability. The use of this technique rather than a direct 
measure of social desirability response bias allows researchers to reduce the number of questions 
in the survey instrument to avoid issues related to the time required for respondents to complete 
the questionnaire. 
Geiger and O'Connell (2000) explored the relationship between the indirect and direct 
measure of social desirability. Their study showed a weak positive relationship between the 
"Halo Effect" and the impression management scale (the direct measure). They administered 10 
ethical scenarios with a social desirability measure to 378 accounting students in the U.S. and 
Australia. They regressed the social desirability measure on the "Halo Effect" measure and found 
a significantly positive relationship between the two measures. However, the direct measure 
explained only about 3% of the variation in the "Halo Effect", indicating that factors other than 
social desirability may be impacting how participants respond to the "Halo Effect" measure; 
Furthermore, the direct measure of social desirability explained 12.8 % and 17.2 % of the self-
reported behavioral intentions (the probability the respondents would commit the same action in 
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similar situation). Based on these results, the .authors recommended the use of a direct measure 
of social desirability in accounting research. One implication of these findings is that "the 
reliability of findings in these sensitive areas of research that do not control for this bias, or rely 
on a surrogate to measure it, are likely to be questioned" (Geiger and O'Connell, 2000 p.1l8). 
For that reason, it was considered necessary to use a direct measure to control for social 
desirability response bias in this study. 
I used Reynold's [1982] M-C Form C scale to measure social desirability response bias. 
The M-C-Form C scale is a shorter version of the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) Social 
Desirability Scale (M-CSDS). The M-CSDS is a 33-item true and false questionnaire. Due to its 
length, many studies have tried to provide a shorter version of the M-CSDS without diluting its 
reliability (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972; Reynolds, 1982). Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) used a 
principle component analysis (excluded items with low loadings) and created three new versions 
of the M-CSDS: the M-C 1(10) that included 10 items, the M-C 2(10) that included 10 items and 
the M-C (20) that included 20 items. All of the short versions provided a satisfactory internal 
reliability with the M-C (20) having the highest internal reliability. Reynolds (1982) used a 
principle factor analysis and created three new forms: the M-C Form A (11 items), M-C Form B 
(12 items), and M-C Form C (13 items). He compared these new forms with the previous forms 
created by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972). Based on his analysis, Strahan and Gerbasi's (1972) M-C 
(20) had the highest internal reliability followed by his M-C Form C. 
The M-C Form C instrument has been used in the ethics literature (e.g., Latif, 2000) and 
represents an effective way to reduce the length of the survey without diluting its reliability. For 
the purpose of my study, I chose the M-C Form C for its efficiency as well as good reliability 
Reynolds (1982). 
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V. RESULTS: 
A. Internal Validity: 
Internal validity consists of the measure of internal reliability coefficients. For this 
purpose, I used the Cronbach Alpha measure. These coefficients will be calculated for each 
dimension. Ideally, to show that the instrument does not suffer from internal consistency issues, 
each dimension should have an internal reliability coefficient greater than .7. Table 7 reports the 
results from my internal reliability analysis (Cronbach Alpha) and shows that only Use of Firm 
Assets (a = .738) and Offering Bribery (a = .715) have an internal reliability over the ideal cutoff 
of .7. Deception (a = .638), Accepting Bribery (a = .622), Independence (a = .641) and Ethical 
Dealing with Co-Workers (a = .572) do not reach the ideal cutoff. However, the AESS is at the 
exploratory phase and therefore we consider that the instrument does not suffer from serious 
internal consistency issues, although this analysis does indicate that further revisions would be 
advisable. In addition, the AESS as a whole has a 0.736 internal reliability, which indicates 
sound internal consistency of the instrument. Thus, I can conclude that the instrument has 
adequate internal validity. 
B. Construct Validity: 
I ran a varimax factor analysis including all of the items but the ethical statements. The 
factor analysis results are used to generate a set of ethical dimensions. Based on my predictions, 
the questionnaire should generate seven dimensions. Results from the factor analysis will help 
me to screen out questions that do not load parsimoniously and to refine the original 
questionnaire to a shorter questionnaire. The instrument resulting from my factor analysis will . 
also be used to generate the ethical sensitivity score. I will only use the questions that load 
parsimoniously in the factor analysis to create the score. 
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The final results from my factor analysis (Table 7) generate a set of eighteen questions 
loading on six dimensions. The number of dimensions is lower than my original expectations. It 
is possible that the students did not perceive some items as different from each other. For 
example, results from the factor analysis show that students grouped the padding expense 
accounts and personal use together. This result is not surprising, since the padding expense 
accounts activities in the questionnaire were for self-interest. Therefore, I rename this dimension 
Personal Use of Firm Assets. One of the falsification questions was perceived as deception. The 
remaining falsification questions did not load parsimoniously and for this reason the falsification 
dimension was excluded. Finally, the bribery dimension loaded on two independent factors. The 
. bribery questions included situations in which the accountant gave bribes and received bribes, 
which is a likely explanation for the two bribery factors. For this reason, I divided my original 
bribery dimension into two bribery dimensions: Accepting Bribes and Offering Bribes. Mter this 
analysis, my instrument contains the following six dimensions: Personal Use of Firm Assets, 
Deception, Accepting Bribes, Independence, Ethical dealing with Co-workers and Offering 
Bribes. 
Table 7 reports the internal reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) for each dimension 
and the factor loadings. Each dimension had a minimum of two questions. Some questions were 
excluded because they loaded on a different factor or had a low factor loading « .5). The 
internal reliability coefficients (=> .600) are satisfactory for exploratory research (Bagozzi, 1994; 
Cohen et al., 2003). 
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Table 7: Reliability and factor analysis: 
Dimensions Factor 
Loadings 
Use of Firm Assets (a = .738): 
An accountant made a few personal long distance calls using the firm's telephone. .754 
An accountant sometimes used the firm's printer for personal needs. .820 
An accountant slightly overstated the amount spent on taxi fares, car mileage, tips and the like on a .696 
business trip. 
On a business trip an accountant bought an expensive meal for a friend and turned the receipt in with .621 
his other travel expenses. 
Deception ( a = .638): 
An accountant, as he/she has been cautioned against doing, occasionally failed to complete an assigned .817 
task because no one else would know (e.g. in a sample of 50 accounts, he/she could not find the last 
account but checked it off knowing that no one would notice). 
An accountant saw one of his/her colleagues taking a laptop computer from the shipping container .736 
before it had been recorded as received and did not report him (knowing that nobody else would notice 
it). 
An accountant reduced the size of miscellaneous expense account by an immaterial amount as a favor .580 
for a client. 
Accepting Bribery ( a = .622): 
An accountant, after checking with his/her superior, he/she accepted a sample of products worth about .692 
$500 offered by one of his clients to ease future transactions. 
An accountant accepted a $5 gift from a colleague for a favor at work. .689 
An accountant was the only member of his/her firm to use an unusually high discount offered by the .742 
client on a personal purchase as a compensation for some favors. 
Independence (a = .641 ): 
Unlike most of his/her colleagues, an accountant did not mention that he/she lives in the same .640 
neighborhood with one of the clients to which he/she was assigned. 
An accountant plays five times a week on the same soccer team as one of the clients he is assigned to. .858 
Although most of his/her colleagues do not, an accountant regularly eats out with one of the clients he .759 
is assigned to. 
Ethical Dealing With Co-Workers ( a = .572 ): 
An accountant spread an unverified rumor that someone's work was below standard and so inadequate .607 
as to endanger the firm's relationship with the client. 
An accountant, as often happens in the workplace, yelled at a colleague in front of everyone. .689 
An accountant discretely made racist remarks about co-workers. .779 
Offering Bribery ( a = .715): 
An accountant obtained a significant service contract worth $15,000 because he/she gave $ 1,000 to .739 
one of the client's employees. 
An accountant verbally authorized small cash payments to a local government official in a foreign .836 
country to facilitate business transactions. 
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C. Content Validi~y: 
Hypotheses Testing: 
An instrument with an acceptable internal reliability does not necessarily measure what it 
is intended to measure. As discussed above, a good coefficient for internal validity would 
demonstrate that the instrument is a good measure for what it is measuring. However, it may be 
measuring something other than ethical sensitivity. To test for content validity, the instrument 
has to behave in a similar manner as previously established constructs interact with specific 
variables. Research on individual variables that have an impact on ethical sensitivity is very 
limited. Nevertheless, previous literature provides strong support for the relationship between 
Machiavellianism (there is a negative relationship between ethical sensitivity and 
Machiavellianism), relativism (there is a negative relationship between relativism and ethical 
sensitivity) and ethical sensitivity. For this reason, I used Machiavellianism, relativism and 
idealism to test the AESS' s content validity. If the instrument has the predicted relationships 
with these variables, I may conclude that the instrument has a reliable content validity. 
To provide support for the instrument's content validity, I use the model shown below 
Model: 
Prior to conducting this analysis, I run an internal reliability measure for SDB, AI, 
MACH IV, Relativism and Idealism. Table 8 below reports the internal reliability of the AESS 
as whole and the criterion instruments: 
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Table 8: Internal Reliabilities 
Survey Internal Validity 
AESS 0.860 
Relativism 0.805 
Idealism 0.829 
MACH IV 0.554 
Anti- 0.841 intellectualism 
MC-From C scale 0.558 
Except for the MACH IV and the M-C Form C scale, the instruments had a satisfactory 
internal reliability coefficient (=> .700). Ideally, a good internal reliability would have a 
coefficient above .7 (Nunnally, 1978). The MACH IV and the M-C Form C are well established 
instruments, and, therefore, their weaker internal reliability is not a cause for concern in this 
study. Previous studies reported similar internal reliability coefficients for the Machiavellianism 
measure (e.g. Rawwas et al., 1994, reported an internal reliability coefficient of .570). 
After testing for the independent variable's internal consistency, I ran the model shown 
above. Table 9 below reports the results from this analysis. 
Table 9: Regression Analysis 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity 
Coefficients Coefficient Exp Sig. Statistics Std. Sign t B Error Beta Tolerance VIP 
(Constant) 36.511 9.654 3.782 0.000 
Age 0.219 0.157 0.093 (-) 1.391 0.166 0.853 1.173 
GenderM= 1 2.839 1.151 0.155 (+) 2.467 0.014 0.967 1.034 
SDSCORE 0.051 0.232 0.014 0.220 0.826 0.904 1.106 
AISCORE 0.101 0.037 0.195 (+) 2.698 0.008 0.724 1.381 
MACH -0.102 0.060 -0.127 (+) -1.703 0.090 0.684 1.462 
Relativism 0.196 0.050 0.259 (+) 3.902 0.000 0.858 1.165 
Idealism -0.059 0.053 -0.075 (-) -1.098 0.274 0.813 1.230 
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The AESS is a 7 - point likert scale that varies from strongly unethical to strongly ethical. 
Thus, the lower the AESS scores, the higher the ethical sensitivity. The overall ethical sensitivity 
score is the sum of the eighteen items generated by the factor analysis. 
I control for age, gender and the social desirability bias. I also control for age and gender, as 
these variables have been found to be significant on prior studies of accounting ethical decision 
making (e.g., Karcher, 1996; Ameen et aI., 1996). Gender is a dichotomous variables (male = 1 
and female = 0). 
My results (reported in Table 9) support previous findings in the literature (e.g., Ameen 
et al., 1996) and provide evidence that females are more ethically sensitive than males (p = .014). 
Interestingly, I don't find a significant relationship between age and AESS. This may be due to a 
lack of variance in that variable, since most of the subjects are around the same age. 
My results show a marginally significant (.090) positive relationship between 
Machiavellianism and AESS. I also find a significant negative relationship between Relativism 
and AESS (p = .000) and a non-significant relationship between Idealism and AESS (p = .274). I 
also find a significant negative relationship between Anti-Intellectualism and AESS (p = .008). 
Since the criterion variables relate in the predicted manner to the AESS, I can conclude that 
content validity has been established. 
D. Social Desirability Analysis: 
I use an ANOYA to investigate the difference between male and female social 
desirability bias. As shown in table 10, my findings contrast with Bernardi's (2006) findings. I 
found a partially significant difference between male and female's social desirability bias. In 
this sample, men were more likely to evidence social desirability response bias than women. 
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Table 10: Social Desirability Response Bias 
Sum of Df Mean F Sig. Squares Square 
Between 29.505 1 29.505 4.578 0.034 Groups 
Within Groups 1392.22 216 6.445 
Total 1421.725 217 
E. Further Analysis: 
I extended my analysis by exploring the relationship between each of the AESS 
dimensions and the independent variables used previously (age, gender, social desirability, anti-
intellectualism, Machiavellianism, relativism and idealism). I calculated the factor scores of each 
dimension and analyzed the relationship with the independent variables. Table 11 summarizes 
the significance levels for each independent variable in the six regressions. 
Table 11: Individual Regressions 
Age Gender SD AI MACH Relativism Idealism 
AESS 0.166 0.014 0.826 0.008 0.090 0.000 0.274 
Ethical 
Dealing with 0.026 0.619 0.174 0.003 0.367 0.132 0.034 
Co-Workers 
Personal Use 0.875 0.345 0.847 0.171 0.081 0.010 0.155 
of Firm Assets 
Deception 0.023 0.807 0.546 0.105 0.061 0.514 0.013 
Accepting 0.817 0.001 0.674 0.570 0.304 0.030 0.268 Bribes 
Independence 0.998 0.003 0.797 0.995 0.843 0.018 0.395 
Offering 0.953 0.780 0.543 0.002 0.462 0.001 0.580 Bribes 
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Results show inconsistencies between the dimensions. My initial final result showed that 
the AESS had relationships with Gender, Anti-intellectualism, Machiavellianism and Relativism. 
The table above shows that, while analyzing the dimensions separately, each dimension had a 
different set of relationships. The Social Desirability variables did not have any significant 
relationship with any of the dimensions. This result does not represent an issue because I 
uniquely used the social desirability variable to control for the social desirability bias. 
F. Post Hoc Analysis: 
For exploratory purposes, I investigate the contribution of the moral intensity component 
to the AESS. I create two new variables called HIGHMI (High Moral Intensity) and LOWMI 
(Low Moral Intensity). HIGHMI (LOWMI) consists of the sum of the questions with high moral 
intensity (Low Moral Intensity). The questions with the ethical statements were excluded and 
analyzed separately. Table 12 shows the results from the paired t-test. 
Table 12: Paired t-test for unethical items with high and low moral intensity 
Std. Std. Error Interval of the df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Deviation Mean Lower Upper T 
-2.65899 5.73277 0.38917 -3.42603 -1.89194 -6.833 216 0.000 
The results show a significant difference between the questions with high moral intensity 
treatment and the questions with low moral intensity treatment. 
I replicated the analysis applied above with the ethical questions. I created two new variables: 
EHIGHMI (Ethical High Moral Intensity) and ELOWMI (Ethical Low Moral Intensity). Table 
13 shows the results from the paired t-test. 
Table 13: Paired t-test for ethical items with high and low moral intensity 
Mean Std. Std. Error 
Interval of the 
T df Sig. (2-tailed) Deviation Mean Lower Upper 
-7.39908 4.63620 0.31400 -8.01797 -6.78020 -23.564 217 0.000 
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The results show a significant difference between the ethical questions with high and low 
moral intensity. These two tests together provide strong evidence that moral intensity impacted 
the responses of the participants. 
VI. DISCUSSION: 
Currently, the literature does not have an unbiased measure to determine ethical 
sensitivity. The AESS is the first instrument that takes into consideration the weaknesses faced 
by earlier instruments in previous research, such as: the absence of a control for social 
desirability bias, the lack of moral intensity elements, the homogeneous structure of the 
instruments, the scarcity of dimensions and vignettes and a lack of generalizability. The 
instrument represents a new way of assessing accountants' ability to assess an ethical dilemma. 
Most of the previous attempts to measure ethical sensitivity do not generate an overall score of 
ethical sensitivity. The AESS generates an overall score that can be used to investigate its 
relationship with other variables. 
The AESS includes six dimensions: Personal Use of Firm Assets, Deception, Accepting 
Bribes, Independence, Ethical dealing with co-workers and Offering Bribes. The instrument 
adopts some questions used in earlier accounting studies (Cohen et al., 1995 b; Cohen et aI., 
1996; O'Leary and Pangemanan, 2007) and classifies them into one of the six dimensions. My 
results provide initial support for the use of these dimensions to measure accountants' ethical 
sensitivity. 
I predicted that highly relativistic individuals would not pay attention to the imposed 
rules and would focus more on the relativistic aspect of an ethical situation rather than its 
compliance to the available code of ethics. The regression analysis results show a significant 
positive coefficient (p = .000) for relativism. This result supports my third hypothesis and 
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provides evidenc~ that highly relativistic individuals are less sensitive to ethical issues than 
individuals with lower relativism. Results from individual regressions for each dimension 
indicate that this positive relationship is supported in four out of the six dimensions: Personal 
Use of Firm Assets, Accepting Bribes, Independence and Offering Bribes. Only Ethical Dealing 
with Co- Workers and Deception did not have a significant relationship with relativism .. 
I also predicted that individuals who are highly idealistic will spend significant efforts to 
make sure that their actions will not cause harm to others. This effort is expressed through a 
higher level of ethical sensitivity. The results failed to support the relationship between Idealism 
and AESS. However, the individual regression analyses provide some evidence that some 
dimensions of the AESS had a significant relationship with idealism. More precisely, I find a 
significant relationship between idealism and Ethical Dealing with Co-Workers (p = .034) and 
deception (p = .013). Therefore, I partially support my fourth hypothesis. It is perhaps important 
that the results with respect to idealism and relativism are mirrors of each other. 
I also predicted that low Machiavellians are willing to spend more effort when facing an 
ethical dilemma and therefore they would be more aware of an ethical issue than individuals with 
high Machiavellianism. My results show a marginally significant (p = .090) positive relationship 
between Machiavellianism and AESS. This finding is contrary to my second hypothesis. 
However, as mentioned previously, research in ethical sensitivity is very limited and most of our 
expectations are drawn from relationships established in the other three steps of Rest' (1986) 
ethical decision making model. As argued by Rest (1986) each step of the ethical decision 
making process is independent. Previous literature provides support for a negative relationship 
between Machiavellianism and ethical judgment (e.g. Rayburn and Rayburn, 1996). The positive 
relationship between Machiavellianism and ethical sensitivity supports the idea that Rests' 
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(1986) steps are independent and do not necessarily share the same relationships with other 
individual difference variables. 
My findings imply that high Machiavellian individuals have a higher ethical sensitivity 
than low Machiavellian individuals. Based on previous findings and these findings, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that individuals with high Machiavellianism are more likely to recognize 
an unethical issue than individuals with lower Machiavellianism. However, even though they 
recognize the possibility of an unethical dilemma, they chose to behave unethically. Results from 
the individual regressions indicate that this finding is limited to two dimensions of the AESS: 
Personal Use of Firms Assets (p = .081) and Deception (p = .061). 
I also predicted that individuals with high AI are less likely to recognize an unethical 
issue than individuals with low AI. My results support my fIrst hypothesis and show a 
significant (p = .008) negative relationship between Anti-intellectualism and Ethical Sensitivity. 
This result supports Elias' (2009) findings. We might propose that students in the Elias (2009) 
study did not perceive cheating as unethical because they were not able to recognize that 
cheating as an ethical issue. The results from the individual regressions are significant for two 
dimensions of the AESS: Ethical dealing with Co-Workers (p = .003) and Offering Bribes (p = 
.002). 
The significant difference between the questions with high and low moral intensity 
supports including this factor in the AESS instrument. This result provides evidence that 
respondents paid attention to the moral intensity component while detecting the presence of an 
unethical or ethical issue. 
My results with respect to content validity are promising and partially support the 
AESS's content validity. The AESS interacts as predicted with one out of the three previously 
70 
identified constructs. Findings related to Machiavellianism are not surprising and need to be 
tested further in future research. The negative relationship between anti-intellectualism and 
ethical sensitivity is supported (p = .008). Previous literature (Elias, 2009; Shaffer, 1981) found 
that highly anti-intellectual students are less likely to perceive cheating as unethicaL From these 
results, I can infer that students with high anti-intellectualism do not spend enough effort while 
assessing an ethical dilemma. Even though previous findings from the ethical sensitivity 
literature did not investigate the relationship between AI and AESS, it strengthens my support 
for the AESS content validity. 
Identifying the level of ethical sensitivity is a critical step for the accounting profession 
and research into accounting ethical decision making. In the recent years, the accounting 
profession's ethical conduct has been criticized due to scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. 
Defining the accountants' ability to identify an ethical issue is critical and may help improve the 
ethical awareness training in the accounting work place. However, it is important to know that 
high ethical sensitivity does not always lead to a more ethical behavior. It only describes the 
individuals' potential to detect the presence of an ethical dilemma but does not guarantee that 
individual will be reluctant to commit an unethical behavior simply because they perceived it. 
Each step of the ethical decision making process is independent and does not lead, by itself, to an 
ethical behavior. Nevertheless, having high ethical sensitivity will help the accountants to detect 
the ethical dilemma and move to the second step in the ethical decision process. 
VII. LIMITATIONS: 
Like most of the previously reported studies, my study suffers from certain limitations. 
Two constructs had low internal validity coefficients. Machiavellianism had an internal 
reliability of (a = 0.554) and the Social Desirability Measure (a = 0.558). These instruments have 
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been extensively used in previous literature and are well established. The low coefficients might 
reflect the characteristics of the subject pool. The sample nature represents a limitation, as well. 
Even though many of the previously reported studies used students as subjects, accounting 
professionals are exposed to a higher level of professional experience and obtaining data from 
them will better represent accountants' ethical sensitivity. 
Another limitation is the use of the words ethical and unethical to anchor the instrument. 
The use of these words may have alerted the subject to the purpose of the study. However, I am 
not aware of any way to avoid this problem and no one in the pre-test group mentioned it. 
Further, while the respondents clearly understood the interest in ethics, it seems doubtful they are 
familiar with the construct of ethical sensitivity. 
Finally, findings from previous literature are limited and inconsistent. This study is 
exploratory in nature. It introduces a new framework for assessing ethical sensitivity and takes 
the first steps in validating a measurement instrument. As such, it is subject to the uncertainties 
of this type of research and accordingly, needs ongoing development. 
VIII. FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: 
This paper represents an initiative to develop an instrument to measure accountant's 
ethical sensitivity. As mentioned in the limitations section, this study suffers from some 
limitations. Future research which focuses on the identified limitations will strengthen the 
proposed instrument and advance research in this area. For example, Individual items could be 
modified to improve the factor structure and therefore obtaining stronger construct validity. 
Repeating the analysis using a sample of practitioners rather than students would improve the 
external validity. 
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Previous literature shows that students develop a certain set of skills such as problem 
, solving and critical thinking during their academic career. It will be interesting to investigate 
whether accounting students' ethical sensitivity increases throughout their academic program. 
Moreover, the ethical sensitivity literature lacks findings regarding the relationship between 
ethical sensitivity and personality traits such as tolerance for ambiguity, and locus of control. 
Furthermore, the literature lacks cross cultural investigations as welL The variation of ethical 
sensitivity across cultures is has not been studied. I argue that the AESS may vary across cultures 
due to individual differences caused by culture. Future research to validate the AESS should 
include cross-cultural comparisons. 
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An accountant obtained a significant service 
1 contract worth $15,000 because he/she gave $ 1 2 3 4 5 
1,000 to one of the client's employees. 
An accountant verbally authorized small cash 
2 payments to a local government official in a I 2 3 4 5 
foreign country to facilitate business transactions. 
3 An accountant refused free movie tickets offered 1 2 3 4 5 by a client as a payback for a favor. 
An accountant, after checking with his/her 
4 superior, he/she accepted a sample of products 1 2 3 4 5 
worth about $500 offered by one of his clients to 
ease future transactions. 
5 An accountant accepted a $5 gift from a 1 2 3 4 5 
colleague for a favor at work. 
An accountant was the only member of his/her 
6 firm to use an unusually high discount offered by I 2 3 4 5 the client on a personal purchase as a 
compensation for some favors. 
An external accountant recommended to a bank 
loan officer that the bank extend a loan to hislher 
7 best friend's company knowing that the company 1 2 3 4 5 
would clearly fail to meet the standard criteria for 
a loan. 
Unlike most of his/her colleagues, An accountant 
8 asked to be removed from an assignment with a 1 2 3 4 5 
company that fired one of his/her family members 
in recessionary times. 
2 Items 1,3,5,6,15,18,28,32,33,34,36,40,41,42 and 44 were adapted from Cardy and Selvarjan (2004). 
Items 2, 7, 19, 20 and 43 were adapted from Cohen et al. (1996). 
Items 17, 21 and 22 were adapted from O'Leary and Pangemanan (2007). 
Item 14 was adapted from Cohen et al. (1995b). 
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An accountant requested not to be assigned to a 
9 project involving a company which frequently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
does business with hislher brother's firm. 
Unlike most of hislher colleagues, an accountant 
10 did not mention that he/she lives in the same 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
neighborhood with one of the clients to which 
he/she was assigned. 
An accountant plays five times a week on the 
11 same soccer team as one of the clients he is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
assigned to. 
Although most of hislher colleagues do not, an 
12 accountant regularly eats out with one of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
clients he is assigned to. 
As his friends in the business have often done, an 
13 accountant represented both the buyer and seller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in the sale of a business. Neither party was 
informed. 
An accountant's firm has recently acquired a new 
client with a very low bid. Contrary to the 
accountant's estimate of 150 hours, the boss 
14 suggested 100 hours for one portion of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 project. The Accountant accepted this suggestion 
and therefore decided to perform fewer 
procedures knowing there would be an important 
impact on the outcome of the engagement. 
An accountant, after finding that a service of 
slightly inferior quality had been performed by 
15 another person on hislher team, promptly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 informed the client and spent more hours fixing it 
(knowing that the client would not notice the 
difference) . 
An accountant, as he/she has been cautioned 
against doing, occasionally failed to complete an 
16 assigned task because no one else would know 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (e.g. in a sample of 50 accounts, he/she could not 
find the last account but checked it off knowing 
that no one would notice). 
An accountant saw one of hislher colleagues 
taking a laptop computer from the shipping 
17 container before it had been recorded as received 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and did not report him (knowing that nobody else 
would notice it). 
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An accountant had discussions with a wealthy 
client who needed professional advice for what he 
18 thought was a severe problem. The accountant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
realized that the client had a minor problem. and 
as advised by hislher colleagues, charged the 
client a very reasonable fee. 
An accountant copied a software package from 
19 one of the firm's clients instead of buying it and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 told everyone that he bought it, knowing that 
many of hislher colleagues have done the same. 
An accountant, in recessionary times, 
20 manipulated significant estimates for bad debts in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
order to increase reported income. 
An accountant, unlike most of his colleagues, 
21 changed his accounting credential on his resume 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in order to get a desirable assignment. 
An accountant altered some line items on the 
22 financial statements to help one of the firm's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
clients obtain a loan. He knows that others would 
not be willing to do this. 
An accountant, contrary to common practice, 
23 reported the exact number of work hours he/she 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
actually worked 
An accountant informed hislher superior that 
he/she made significant progress with an assigned 
24 task when he/she was actually still far from done. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 He/she was planning to work on it overnight and 
get the work done before seeing hislher superior 
the next day. 
An accountant reduced the size of miscellaneous 
25 expense account by an immaterial amount as a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
favor for a client. 
An accountant stated that the services he/she 
26 provided were much superior to one of his 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
colleagues. 
An accountant spread an unverified rumor that 
27 someone's work was below standard and so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 inadequate as to endanger the firm's relationship 
with the client. 
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An accountant set the record straight when hislher 
28 superior mistakenly believed that the accountant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 deserved a significant bonus for landing a major 
new customer. 
29 An accountant sometimes engaged in a little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 interpersonal gossip with coworkers. 
An accountant, as often happens in the 
30 workplace, yelled at a colleague in front of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
everyone. 
An accountant, in spite of opposition from 
31 colleagues always made sure in meetings to allow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
everyone to voice hislher opinion. 
32 An accountant discretely made racist remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
about co-workers. 
33 An accountant made a few personal long distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
calls using the firm's telephone. 
34 An accountant, like most colleagues, took home 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
small items meant to be used for advertising. 
35 An accountant sometimes used the firm's printer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 for personal needs. 
An accountant, when using the company phone 
36 for making persona110ng distance calls, promptly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 informed the company so that it could be charged 
to hislher personal account. 
An accountant, like most colleagues, used the 
37 company's software to do personal taxes for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 family and friends (the firm did not have any 
policy regarding the matter). 
An accountant, when using reams of paper for 
38 personal use, promptly informed the company so 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 that it could be charged to hislher personal 
account. 
On a business trip an accountant bought an 
39 expensive meal for a friend and turned the receipt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
in with his other travel expenses. 
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40 An accountant incurred $ 1000 in expenses on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 business travel and reported $ 2000. 
41 An accountant, like most colleagues, spent travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and lodging money carefully. 
An accountant slightly overstated the amount 
42 spent on taxi fares, car mileage, tips and the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
like on a business trip. 
An accountant charged the company for 
43 personal expenses (e.g. fifty dollars for 1 2 3 4 5 6 .7 
family gifts) while traveling on business. 
An accountant, on a business trip, reported a 
44 thirty dollar cab ride when he/she actually 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
walked. 
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